How Secure Is Social Security? by Keyfitz, N.





Keyfitz, N. (1981) How Secure Is Social Security? IIASA Working Paper. Copyright © 1981 by the author(s). 
http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/1660/ 
Working Papers on work of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis receive only limited review. Views or 
opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the Institute, its National Member Organizations, or other 
organizations supporting the work. All rights reserved. Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work 
for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial 
advantage. All copies must bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. For other purposes, to republish, to post on 
servers or to redistribute to lists, permission must be sought by contacting repository@iiasa.ac.at 
NOT FOR QUOTATION 
WITHOUT PERMISSION 
OF THE AUTHOR 
HOW SECURE I S  SOCIAL SECURITY? 
Nathan Keyf i t z  
J u l y  1981 
WP-81-101 
Working Paper8 are i n t e r i m  r e p o r t s  on work of  t h e  
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  I n s t i t u t e  f o r  Applied Systems Analys i s  
and have r ece ived  on ly  l i m i t e d  review. V i e w s  o r  
op in ions  expressed  h e r e i n  do n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  r ep re -  
s e n t  t hose  o f  t h e  I n s t i t u t e  o r  of  i t s  Nat iona l  Member 
Organ iza t ions .  
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 
A-2361 Laxenburg, A u s t r i a  
Nathan Keyfitz, Professor of Sociology at Harvard University 
and at Ohio State University, is a member of the U.S. National 
Academy of Sciences and the author of a number of books on 
mathematical demography, among them Introduction t o  the Mathe- 
matics of Population and Applied Mathematical Demography. 
FOREWORD 
Sharply reduced rates of population and industrial growth 
have been projected for many of the developed nations in the 
1980s. In economies that rely primarily on market mechanisms 
to redirect capital and labor from surplus to deficit areas, 
the problems of adjustment may be slow and socially costly. In 
the more centralized economies, increasing difficulties in deter- 
mining investment allocations and inducing sectoral redistribu- 
tions of a nearly constant or diminishing labor force may arise. 
The socioeconomic problems that flow from such changes in 
labor demands and supplies form the contextual background of the 
Manpower Analysis Task, which is striving to develop methods for 
analyzing and projecting the impacts of international, national, 
and regional population dynamics on labor supply, demand, and 
productivity in the more-developed nations. One subtask is exam- 
ining the growing problem of rising social security costs in 
industrialized countries. In this paper, Nathan Keyfitz observes 
that the problem of rising costs is likely to remain a tense is- 
sue for another half century, until by 2035 the demographic con- 
tributor to these costs will have reached a maximum and will 
start to decline, as the baby boom cohorts begin to die off. 
Keyfitz concludes his essay with a call for learning from the 
lessons of European experiences. Work on this topic is being 
directed toward that goal in the Human Settlements and Services 
Area. 
Publications in the Manpower Analysis Task series are listed 




and Services Area 
I am g r a t e f u l  f o r  s u g g e s t i o n s  t o  Andrei  Rogers ,  Zenas Sykes,  
L u i s  C a s t r o ,  and o t h e r s  a t  IIASA and Johns  Hopkins. 
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INTRODUCTION 
S o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  p r e s e n t s  a  c o n t i n u i n g  and e v e r  more d i f f i -  
c u l t  problem. When t h e  U.S. scheme was p a t c h e d  by t h e  L e g i s l a -  
t u r e  i n  1977 t h e  Commissioner d e c l a r e d  t h a t  t h e  sys tem would be  
i n  good h e a l t h  f i n a n c i a l l y  f o r  t h e  n e x t  50 y e a r s .  Four  y e a r s  
l a t e r  t h e  fund i s  n e a r i n g  bankruptcy  a g a i n .  Other  c o u n t r i e s  a r e  
do ing  o n l y  s l i g h t l y  b e t t e r ;  a  c u r r e n t  newspaper h e a d l i n e  c a l l s  
E u r o p e ' s  s o c i a l  programs a n  endangered  s p e c i e s .  What makes it 
a  problem i s  t h e  s t e a d y  i n c r e a s e s  o f  c o s t  t h a t  i s  everywhere ex- 
p e r i e n c e d ,  c o n t r a r y  t o  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  e x p e c t a t i o n s  under  which 
s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  h a s  been i n i t i a t e d  and expanded. The U.S. scheme 
was more o p t i m i s t i c  t h a n  most ;  it s t a r t e d  w i t h  a  c o n t r i b u t i o n  of  
1  p e r c e n t  o f  wages by employees and a n o t h e r  1  p e r c e n t  by employ- 
ers,  and t h e  p u b l i c  was p l e a s e d  and s u r p r i s e d  t h a t  p r o v i s i o n  f o r  
o l d  age  c o u l d  be made s o  c h e a p l y .  Other  c o u n t r i e s  w e r e  more re- 
a l i s t i c  a t  t h e  o u t s e t  b u t  s t i l l  f a c e  s h a r p l y  r i s i n g  c o s t s .  
Y e t  e v e r y  i n d u s t r i a l  c o u n t r y  h a s  a  scheme, and none t h i n k s  
o f  abandoning it. A l l  a r e  concerned w i t h  c o s t s ,  y e t  e a c h  o f  
t h e i r  p u b l i c s  p r e f e r  t o  depend on i t s  c h i l d r e n  c o l l e c t i v e l y  
r a t h e r  t h a n  i n d i v i d u a l l y ,  and it wants  t h e  s t a t e  t o  be t h e  i n t e r -  
mediary ,  t a k i n g  up and d i s b u r s i n g  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  f u n d s .  
The Reagan a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i s  probing budgets t o  c u t  c o s t s ,  
b u t  it has  been wary of c u t t i n g  pens ions ,  t h e  l a r g e s t  i t em of 
s o c i a l  expend i tu re  which accounts  f o r  one q u a r t e r  of  t h e  t o t a l  
Federa l  budget .  Like t h e  United S t a t e s ,  European c o u n t r i e s  have 
come t o  t h e  p o i n t  where t a x e s  a r e  seen  a s  a  hindrance t o  i n v e s t -  
ment, a s  w e l l  a s  a  d i s i n c e n t i v e  t o  work. Sweden proposed t o  
reduce income t a x e s  t o  a  maximum of 50 pe rcen t  from t h e  p r e s e n t  
80 p e r c e n t ;  t h e  Nether lands  p l a n s  t o  c u t  p u b l i c  spending by 10 
pe rcen t  each yea r  f o r  t h e  nex t  5  yea r s ;  West Germany, wi th  a  cap  
on p r e s e n t  spending i s  being pressed  by elements i n  t h e  r u r a l  
S o c i a l  Democratic Pa r ty  t o  s h i f t  money from defense  t o  s o c i a l  
a r e a s .  A l l  t h e s e  and o t h e r  governments a r e  looking hard  f o r  sav- 
i ngs  b u t  s o  f a r  they a r e  l eav ing  o l d  age s e c u r i t y  s e v e r e l y  a lone .  
Pensions a r e  an example of how quick ly  a  human need can be 
c r e a t e d  and f i r m l y  roo ted .  We a r e  on ly  now c e l e b r a t i n g  t h e  cen- 
t e n n i a l  of t h e  f i r s t  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  scheme, t h a t  was i n s t a l l e d  
by Bismark i n  i m p e r i a l  Germany i n  1881. The United S t a t e s  scheme 
s t a r t e d  t o  o p e r a t e  on ly  40 y e a r s  ago. P r i o r  t o  t hose  d a t e s  peo- 
p l e  who could  no longer  work simply expected t o  be looked a f t e r  
by t h e i r  c h i l d r e n .  
I n  one sense  o l d  age s e c u r i t y  i s  t h e  same t h i n g  a s  being 
looked a f t e r  by o n e ' s  c h i l d r e n .  The gene ra t ion  t h a t  works pro- 
v ides  t h e  suppor t  f o r  t h e  gene ra t ion  t h a t  i s  r e t i r e d ,  and mostly 
t h e  former a r e  t h e  c h i l d r e n  of  t h e  l a t t e r .  Unlike o l d  age se- 
c u r i t y  adminis te red  by t h e  s t a t e ,  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  way of looking 
a f t e r  t h e  o l d  i s  i n d i v i d u a l ,  household by household,  whi le  t h e  
modern way i s  c o l l e c t i v e .  I t  was once taken  f o r  g ran t ed  t h a t  
o l d  people  would be p a r t  of t h e  household of t h e i r  c h i l d r e n .  Now 
both  gene ra t ions  want t h e  freedom and pr ivacy  t h a t  comes of l i v -  
i n g  a p a r t  and of having t h e i r  maintenance provided i n  cash  r a t h e r  
than  i n  k ind .  I t  has  taken  only a  few decades f o r  t h i s  d e s i r e  
t o  harden i n t o  an a b s o l u t e  n e c e s s i t y ,  s o  t h a t  t h e  most determined 
budget c u t t e r  has n o t  dared  t o  w h i t t l e  away any p a r t  of  t h e  l e v e l  
of payment s o  f a r  a t t a i n e d .  
I n  f a c t  t h e  payment becomes s t e a d i l y  g r e a t e r .  This  i s  p a r t l y  
because o f  t h e  dynamics of  p o l i t i c s  i n  a  democrat ic  s o c i e t y  and 
t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  l e n g t h  of l i f e .  During t h e  one decade of t h e  1970s 
American male e x p e c t a t i o n  a t  age  65 h a s  i n c r e a s e d  by more t h a n  
one y e a r ;  female  by more t h a n  1 1/2 y e a r s .  That  means t h a t  ove r  
t h e  p e r i o d  i n  which t h ey  w i l l  draw, and q u i t e  a s i d e  from any 
changes i n  t h e  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  Americans, male and female  a l i k e ,  
i n c r e a s e  t h e i r  t o t a l  l i f e t i m e  b e n e f i t s  by abou t  8 p e r c e n t  on t h e  
average .  Th i s  p l u s  t h e  r i s i n g  c o s t  of  Medicare,  p l u s  food stamps 
and o t h e r h e l p t h a t  i s  t h e  e q u i v a l e n t  of  c a s h ,  a l l  r e s i s t a n t  t o  
budget  c u t s  t h a t  a r e  e l s ewhe re  m e r c i l e s s ,  i s  ev idence  o f  t h e  de- 
g r e e  t o  which t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  c a r e  o f  t h e  o l d ,  th rough  government,  
h a s  become f i x e d  i n  p u b l i c  e x p e c t a t i o n s .  
Th i s  h a r d en i n g  o f  e x p e c t a t i o n s  t h a t  g e n e r a t e  r i s i n g  c o s t s  
i s  now opposed by a growing r e s i s t a n c e  t o  t a x e s .  Two such s t r o n g  
f o r c e s  i n  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  one a n o t h e r  i n s u r e  c o n t i n u i n g  t e n s i o n .  
S o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  i s  n o t  a n  i s s u e  t h a t  w i l l  be r e p l a c e d  on t h e  pub- 
l i c  agenda by something else i n  a y e a r  o r  two j u s t  because  p e o p l e ,  
g e t  t i r e d  of  h e a r i n g  ab o u t  it. Boring o r  n o t ,  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  
w i l l  be w i t h  u s  a s  a n  i n c r e a s i n g l y  t e n s e  i s s u e  f o r  a n o t h e r  55 
y e a r s .  W e  w i l l  be c l i m b i ng  t h e  rentenberg, a s  Germans c a l l  it, 
t h e  p e n s io n  mountain. By 2035 t h e  demographic component o f  c o s t s  
w i l l  have reached  a maximum and s t a r t  t o  d e c l i n e ,  a s  t h e  baby 
boom c o h o r t s  beg in  t o  d i e  o f f .  One canno t  g u a r a n t e e  t h a t  t h i n g s  
w i l l  be b e t t e r  a f t e r  2035, b u t  a t  l e a s t  t h e  demographic f a c t o r  
w i l l  s t a r t  t o  work f o r  r a t h e r  t h a n  a g a i n s t  u s .  
The f o l l o w i n g  d i s c u s s i o n  t a k e s  t h e  p e r s p e c t i v e s  o f  t h e  sev- 
e r a l  d i s c i p l i n e s  i n v o l v ed .  A b r i e f  l e g i s l a t i v e  h i s t o r y  s u g g e s t s  
some of  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  f o r c e s ;  r e l e v a n t  demographic f a c t s  a r e  
o u t l i n e d ;  t h e  t r a n s l a t i o n  o f  t h e s e  i n t o  c o s t s  i s  ske t ched  w i t h  
t h e  h e l p  o f  a c t u a r i a l  mathemat ics ;  t h e  r e l a t i o n  of  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  
t o  economic p r o g r e s s  i s  i n d i c a t e d ;  t h e  f i n a l  theme i s  s o c i a l  
s e c u r i t y  and t h e  f i n a n c i a l  r e l a t i o n s  between t h e  g e n e r a t i o n s .  
MANY DISCIPLINES INVOLVED 
Each o f  t h e  d i s c i p l i n e s  t h a t  b e a r  on t h e  q u e s t i o n s  of t h i s  
paper  p o se s  i t s  own q u e s t i o n s ,  makes i t s  own assumpt ions ,  and 
o f f e r s  i t s  own ( v e r y  p a r t i a l )  answers.  A c t u a r i a l  s c i e n c e  con- 
s i d e r s  t h e  funded scheme f o r  a  c o h o r t  ( o r  e q u i v a l e n t l y ,  expec ted  
v a l u e s  f o r  i n d i v i d u a l s )  and works o u t  premiums on d i f f e r e n t  
methods o f  payment, a s  w e l l  a s  revenues  f o r  i n d i v i d u a l s  and f o r  
p o p u l a t i o n s .  For i t ,  each  c o h o r t  i s  s e p a r a t e  from each  o t h e r ;  
a l l  funds  g a t h e r  i n t e r e s t  a t  a  market  r a t e  which t hey  a r e  t o o  
s m a l l  t o  a f f e c t .  A c t u a r i e s  most ly  developed t h e i r  s c i e n c e  i n  
t h e  s e r v i c e  of  i n d i v i d u a l  companies,  and t h e  r a t e - s e t t i n g  o f  any 
company can  s a f e l y  a c c e p t  p r e v a i l i n g  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  w i t h o u t  any 
need t o  f e a r  t h a t  i t s  o p e r a t i o n s  w i l l  a f f e c t  t h a t  r a t e .  
Economists ,  on t h e  o t h e r  hand, a r e  aware,  a t  l e a s t  s i n c e  t h e  
a d v e n t  o f  macroeconomics, t h a t  major d e c i s i o n s  do a f f e c t  p r i c e s  
i n c l u d i n g t h e p r i c e  o f  money. I f  peop le  s a v e  more, t h e  r a t e  of 
i n t e r e s t  w i l l  f a l l .  Depending on inves tment  o p p o r t u n i t i e s ,  more 
s a v i n g  may o r  may n o t  i n c r e a s e  employment. New s a v i n g s  t h a t  no 
one wants  t o  borrow f o r  inves tment  c o u l d ,  f o l l owing  Keynes, throw 
peop le  o u t  of  work; i n s o f a r  a s  t h e s e  s a v i n g s  reduce  consumption 
from i t s  p r ev i o u s  l e v e l ,  demand w i l l  f a l l  s h o r t  o f  t h e  supp ly  o f  
goods. 
Tha t  peop le  may want t o  d i s t r i b u t e  consumption over  t h e i r  
l i v e s  i n  a  f a s h i o n  more o r  less independen t  o f  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  
of  e a r n i n g s  was obse rved  by I r v i n g  F i s h e r  h a l f  a  c e n t u r y  back 
and s u b s eq u en t l y  developed by Franco Modig l i an i  and many o t h e r s .  
I n  p a r t i c u l a r  p eo p l e  w i l l  want t o  s ave  f o r  t h e i r  o l d  age  and 
sometimes t o  make b eq u es t s  t o  t h e i r  c h i l d r e n ,  incomes o f  we l l -o f f  
p r o f e s s i o n a l s  a r e  more u n equa l l y  d i s t r i b u t e d  ove r  l i f e  t h a n  t h o s e  
o f  t h e  poor ,  and t h e  wea l thy  have more ( though f a r  from u n l i m i t e d )  
o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  r e d i s t r i b u t e  by borrowing. 
The q u e s t i o n  o f  o l d  age  s e c u r i t y  i s  n o t  d e a l t  w i t h  ex ten-  
s i v e l y  i n  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  o f  soc io logy ,  b u t  one can s k e t c h  o u t  t h e  
p e r s p e c t i v e  t h a t  t h e  d i s c i p l i n e  would use .  I n  s o c i e t i e s  where 
t h e  f a m i l y  i s  a  t i g h t l y  i n t e g r a t e d  u n i t  t h e  aged would n o t  t y p i -  
c a l l y  be t h e  concern  of  any group beyond t h e  fami ly .  I n  t h e  ex- 
c e p t i o n a l  i n s t a n c e s  of  t h o s e  who do n o t  marry o r  a r e  s t e r i l e  and 
who have no c o l l a t e r a l  r e l a t i v e s  t h e  l o c a l  community might  come 
i n t o  t h e  p i c t u r e ;  f a i l i n g  t h a t ,  homes f o r  t h e  aged might  be es- 
t a b l i s h e d  under  t h e  a u s p i c e s  o f  t h e  church,  u s u a l l y  on a  l o c a l  
b a s i s .  
I n  modern t i m e s  t h e  d e c l i n e  o f  s o l i d a r i t y  i n  t h e  f ami ly  a s  
w e l l  a s  i n  t h e  church  and t h e  r i s i n g  s t r e n g t h  o f  t h e  S t a t e  has  
s h i f t e d  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  t o  t h i s  l a s t .  I t  i s  not  i n  a  posi -  
t i o n  t o  look a f t e r  i n d i v i d u a l s  by in fo rma l ly  prov id ing  s e r v i c e s  
i n  k ind ,  and o l d  p e o p l e ' s  homes run by t h e  S t a t e  would t o o  much 
resemble j a i l s  o r  homes f o r  t h e  f e e b l e  minded, s o  t h e  S t a t e  as-  
s i s t a n c e  i s  provided i n  cash .  That t h i s  h e l p  i s  s o  f i r m l y  
i n s i s t e d  on by t h e  modern e l e c t o r a t e  t e s t i f i e s  t o  t h e  r e l a t i v e  
i n c a p a c i t y  of t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  i n s t i t u t i o n s - f a m i l y  and church.  
The ques t ion  then  comes t o  be whether t h e  s o l i d a r i t y  of  t h e  
S t a t e  w i l l  s u f f i c e  t o  c a r r y  t h e  burden. Those who have supported 
t h e  prev ious  gene ra t ion  have some doubts  about  t h e i r  own o l d  age 
s e c u r i t y .  Without t h a t  s o l i d a r i t y  t h e  l o g i c a l  p o l i c y  f o r  t h e  pres -  
e n t  gene ra t ion  o f  t h o s e  working i s  t o  f o r g e t  t h e  aged a s  Samuelson 
sugges t s :  " In  terms of  immediate s e l f - i n t e r e s t  t h e  e x i s t i n g  pro- 
duc t ive  workers should perhaps u n i l a t e r a l l y  r e p u d i a t e  t h e  money 
on which t h e  aged hope t o  l i v e  i n  r e t i r e m e n t . "  (Samuelson 1958) 
Notice t h a t  t h i s  way of see ing  t h e  problem i n  terms of  s o l i -  
d a r i t y  does n o t  l ead  t o  any " s o l u t i o n . "  The s o c i o l o g i s t  seeks  
t o  know how t h i n g s  work, and h e s i t a t e s  t o  make immediate p o l i c y  
recommendations. 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
I n  t h e  1935 Congress t h e  o r i g i n a l  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  arrange-  
ment was voted by t h e  Democratic ma jo r i t y ;  Republicans were op- 
posed, and they  c a r r i e d  t h e i r  oppos i t i on  t o  t h e  people  i n  t h e  
1936 e l e c t i o n .  This  was t h e  l a s t  s e r i o u s  oppos i t i on  t h a t  s o c i a l  
s e c u r i t y  l e g i s l a t i o n  has  had t o  f a c e  from e i t h e r  p a r t y ;  i t  has  
been nonpa r t i s an  from 1 9 4 0  onwards. I t  i s  worth r e c a l l i n g  t h a t  
what Republicans opposed i n  1935 was a  c o n s e r v a t i v e l y  planned 
scheme i n  which p a y r o l l  t a x e s  c o l l e c t e d  from 1937 onwards would 
b u i l d  up a  s u b s t a n t i a l  t r u s t  fund; they  have s i n c e  gone a long  
wi th  t h e  succes s ion  o f  changes t h a t  have depar ted  eve r  f u r t h e r  
from conse rva t ive  f i nanc ing .  
I n  1939 t h e  s t a r t  of b e n e f i t  payments was advanced from 1942 
t o  1 9 4 0 ,  and s u r v i v o r s  and dependents were b lanke ted  i n  wi th  no 
a d d i t i o n a l  premiums. A t  t h e  same t i m e  a s  it advanced t h e  i n -  
c r eased  b e n e f i t s ,  Congress postponed a  scheduled i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  
t a x .  That  postponement was r epea t ed  u n t i l  1950 when t h e  t a x  was 
r a i s e d  t o  a  modest 1.5 p e r c e n t  f o r  each  o f  employer and employee. 
But  i n  1950 Congress i n c r e a s e d  b e n e f i t s  a g a i n ,  t o  t a k e  inmedia te  
e f f e c t .  I t  a l s o  p rov ided  f o r  r a i s i n g  t h e  t a x  f u r t h e r ,  b u t  n o t  
t o  s t a r t  u n t i l  1954. Edward T u f t e  (1978) coun t s  13 b e n e f i t  i n -  
c r e a s e s  from 1950 t o  1976, w i t h  p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y  more i n  e l e c t i o n  
y e a r s .  These i n c l u d e d  co un t i ng  a s  f u l l y  i n s u r e d  any c o n t r i b u t o r s  
who p a i d  on a s  l i t t l e  a s  $50 e a r n i n g s  i n  each  o f  40 q u a r t e r s ,  
and,  from 1972 onwards, b e n e f i t s  a u t o m a t i c a l l y  i n c r e a s e d  by t h e  
p r i c e  r ise o f  t h e  p r ev i o u s  y e a r .  
While Congress i n c r e a s e d  b e n e f i t s  p e r i o d i c a l l y ,  each  t i m e  
t o  t a k e  e f f e c t  immedia te ly ,  it r a i s e d  t a x e s  t h a t  would pay f o r  
them l a t e r  i f  a t  a l l ;  one s u s p e c t s  t h a t  t h i s  p r o c e s s  i s  l i k e l y  
t o  c o n t i n u e  a s  a  m a t t e r  o f  p o l i t i c a l  dynamics. One f o r e s e e s  £re-  
q u e n t  n ea r - b an k r u p t c i e s  o f  t h e  fund and l a s t -m inu t e  r e s c u e s  by 
c o n g r e s s i o n a l  a c t i o n .  I n  a l l  t h i s  p o p u l a t i o n  changes  a r e  i n t e r -  
twined w i t h  changing s o c i a l  c o n d i t i o n s  and w i t h  p o l i t i c a l  p r e s -  
s u r e s .  
There  i s  a  c a s e  f o r  p r o t e c t i n g  sound programs from t h e  a r -  
b i t r a r i n e s s  o f  an n u a l  a p p r o p r i a t i o n s .  A f t e r  a l l ,  t h e  c o n s t i t u -  
t i o n  of  Congress might  change,  and Democrats e s p e c i a l l y  wanted 
t o  make it h a r d e r  f o r  Republ icans  t o  tamper w i t h  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y ,  
Medicare, and o t h e r  s i m i l a r  l e g i s l a t i o n .  The formula  i n  s e v e r a l  
c a s e s ,  i n c l u d i n g  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y ,  t i e d  payments t o  t h e  Consumer 
Price Index.  O f t en  Congress was persuaded t o  p a s s  t h e  l e g i s l a -  
t i o n ,  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  e n t i t l e m e n t  c l a u s e ,  by g r o s s  u n d e r e s t i m a t e s  
o f  what t h e  c o s t  would be.  When more r e a l i s t i c  e s t i m a t e s  o f  
c o s t s  became a v a i l a b l e  it  t u r n e d  o u t  t o  be ve ry  d i f f i c u l t  t o  
change t h e  formula.  
Such i n f l e x i b i l i t y  i s  n o t  con f ined  t o  U.S. l e g i s l a t i o n ,  a s  
Max H o r l i ck  (1979:97) p o i n t s  o u t .  Women's e q u a l i t y ,  f o r  example, 
ought  t o  i n c l u d e  r e t i r e m e n t  a t  t h e  same ages  a s  men-or even 
l a t e r ,  i f  one c o u n t s  from t h e  end o f  l i f e  backward t o  g i v e  t h e  
s e x e s  t h e  same expec ted  t i m e  t o  draw. But many c o u n t r i e s  have 
t r a d i t i o n a l l y  p rov ided  f o r  women t o  draw from age 60,  f i v e  y e a r s  
b e f o r e  men. Tha t  means t h a t  on t h e  ave r age  women a r e  on pens ion  
9  y e a r s  l o n g e r  t h an  men-an exces s  o f  abou t  75 p e r c e n t .  Y e t ,  
r e p o r t s  H o r l i ck ,  a l t e r a t i o n  seems p o l i t i c a l l y  imposs ib l e .  
DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS 
Any a n a l y s i s  o f  what w i l l  happen t o  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  i n  t h e  
f u t u r e  must  s t a r t  w i t h  e s t i m a t e s  o f  f u t u r e  p o p u l a t i o n .  The o u t -  
come i s  modera te ly  s e n s i t i v e  t o  t h e  assumpt ions  f o r  b i r t h s  a f t e r  
a b o u t  20 y e a r s  and f o r  d e a t h s  from t h e  beg inn ing .  
W e  b e g i n  w i t h  a  f o r e c a s t  t h a t  s imply  supposes  t h a t  t h e  popu- 
l a t i o n  w i l l  r e p l a c e  i t s e l f  and t h a t  m o r t a l i t y  w i l l  be s u b j e c t  t o  
s low improvement. Thus o u r  female  e x p e c t a t i o n  o f  l i f e  a t  age  
z e r o  rises t o  77.7 y e a r s  by 2075 and male t o  72 .4 ,  f i g u r e s  t h a t  
a r e  l i t t l e  above t h o s e  a l r e a d y  a t t a i n e d .  
A proxy f o r  t h e  burden o f  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  i s  t h e  number of  
p e r s o n s  65 and o v e r  p e r  100 p e r s o n s  1-64. Our c a l c u l a t i o n  shows 
a  c l imb ,  s low a t  f i r s t  b u t  r a p i d  a f t e r  a b o u t  t h e  y e a r  2010, and 
a  l e v e l l i n g  o f f  a b o u t  2030. An e x c e r p t  from a  more d e t a i l e d  t a b l e  
i s  g i v e n  a s  Tab le  1  below. I f  w e  had been more generous  i n  re- 
s p e c t  of m o r t a l i t y  w e  would have shown a  c l i m b  of t h e  r a t i o  t o  a  
h i g h e r  p l a t e a u .  Thus t h e  U.S. Bureau o f  t h e  Census f i n d s  a n  even 
s t e e p e r  rise i n  t h e  2 1 s t  c e n t u r y  ( S t a t i s t i c a l  A b s t r a c t  1 9 8 0 ) .  
Tab le  1. E s t i m a t e  of  p e r s o n s  15-64 and 65 and o v e r ,  Uni ted  
S t a t e s ,  1980-2060. 
R a t i o  100X 
Year 15-64 6  5+ 65+/15-64 
1980 146,212 23,281 15.9 
Source:  A u t h o r ' s  c a l c u l a t i o n .  
P a r t l y  because of t h e  i n i t i a l  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on t h e  d i sburse-  
ment of b e n e f i t ,  t h a t  2 p e r c e n t  of p a y r o l l s  d i d  a t  f i r s t  s e rve  
t h e  purpose,  and even s u f f i c e d  t o  b u i l d  up a  t r u s t  fund of some 
dimensions.  Aside from t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on b e n e f i t s ,  demography 
was k ind  t o  t h e  scheme i n  i t s  f i r s t  y e a r s .  The r a t i o  of t h e  num- 
b e r  of persons  65 and over  t o  those  18 t o  2 4  was 0.11 i n  1940; 
each 100 men and women of working age had only 1 1  people  of re-  
t i r e d  age t o  suppor t .  Of course  what counts  i s  n o t  people  of 
working and r e t i r e d  ages  b u t  people w i th  jobs  and c o n t r i b u t i n g  
v e r s u s  people  drawing; t h a t  we w i l l  come t o  l a t e r .  
To i l l u s t r a t e  such m a t t e r s  a  Lexis  diagram, drawn i n  t h e  
age-time p l ane ,  w i l l  be found u s e f u l .  I t  r e p r e s e n t s  each i n d i -  
v i d u a l  of a  popula t ion  a s  a  d iagona l  l i n e ,  corresponding t o  t h e  
f a c t  t h a t  every  yea r  a  person grows one y e a r  o l d e r .  A f i g u r e  
t h a t  ske t ches  t h e  e v o l u t i o n  of t h e  American popu la t ion  i n t o  t h e  
2 1 s t  cen tu ry  shows how t h e  baby boom of  t h e  1950s comes i n t o  t h e  
l abo r  f o r c e  about  now, and how it works i t s  way through and en- 
t e r s  t h e  pensionable  group by t h e  f i r s t  q u a r t e r  of t h e  new cen- 
t u r y .  We should be s u r p r i s e d  t h a t  t h e  fund i s  having d i f f i c u l -  
t i e s  now when t h e  r a t i o  of  o ld  t o  working people  i s  i n c r e a s i n g  
slowly i f  a t  a l l ;  t h e  r e a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  a r e ' s t i l l  t h r e e  o r  fou r  
decades ahead of us .  
On t h e  s u r f a c e  it appears  t h a t  t h e  t r o u b l e s  of s o c i a l  secur -  
i t y  a r e  mainly caused by improved m o r t a l i t y  a t  o l d e r  ages .  To 
show what has  happened t o  m o r t a l i t y ,  it  could  be argued,  w e  need 
t o  look a t  advances i n  t h e  e x p e c t a t i o n  of l i f e .  That  e x p e c t a t i o n  
a t  age ze ro  could have been a s  low a s  45 y e a r s  i n  1880; it h a s  
r i s e n  t o  about  60 yea r s  by 1930; now i n  1980 it i s  n e a r i n g  75 
yea r s .  The improvement i s  about  30 y e a r s  dur ing  t h e  cen tu ry ,  
about  15 y e a r s  s i n c e  1930. A s  t h e  e x p e c t a t i o n  goes beyond 65 t h e  
burden of o l d  age in su rance  i n c r e a s e s  r a p i d l y .  
Such reasoning  i n  terms of expected l i f e t i m e  i s  a lmost  en- 
t i r e l y  erroneous.  The e x p e c t a t i o n  of l i f e  a t  age ze ro  i s  much 
in f luenced  by t h e  drop  i n  i n f a n t  m o r t a l i t y ,  a s  well a s  by t h e  
v i r t u a l  d i sappearance  of many i n f e c t i o u s  d i s e a s e s  of  l a t e r  c h i l d -  
hood and young adul thood,  of which t u b e r c u l o s i s  i s  a prime ex- 
ample. A s tudy of t h e  s u r v i v o r s h i p  curve i s  what i s  wanted, r a t h e r  
t h a n  o f  t h e  e x p e c t a t i o n  of  l i f e ;  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  of l i v i n g  have 
r i s e n  most p r i o r  t o  t h e  age of  r e t i r e m e n t .  E v iden t l y  t h e  tendency 
s i n c e  t h e  beg inn ing  o f  t h e  m o r t a l i t y  r e c o r d  ha s  been f o r  a  l a r g e r  
and l a r g e r  f r a c t i o n  o f  peop le  t o  l i v e  i n t o  adu l t hood ,  wh i l e  ex- 
t e n s i o n  of t h e  span o f  l i f e  has  been s l i g h t .  The e f f e c t  o f  mor- 
t a l i t y  change a s  s u c h h a s  been most ly  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  working 
p o p u l a t i o n  by r ed u c i n g  m o r t a l i t y  a t  younger ages .  W e  can  examine 
t h e  r a t i o  of  65 and o v e r  t o  20 t o  65 i n  s u c c e s s i v e  l i f e  t a b l e s  t o  
demons t ra te  t h i s .  
What h a s  r a i s e d  t h e  r a t i o  of  t h o s e  65 and o v e r  t o  t h o s e  20 
t o  65 from 0.11 i n  1940 t o  0.18 today and w i l l  i n c r e a s e  it by 
a b o u t  50 p e r c e n t  su b seq u en t l y ,  i s  f e r t i l i t y  change.  I n  an impor- 
t a n t  s e n s e  one can s a y  t h a t  t h e  h igh  and i n c r e a s i n g  c o s t  o f  s o c i a l  
s e c u r i t y  i s  caused  n o t  a s  much by t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  o l d e r  popu- 
l a t i o n  a s  by t h e  r e l a t i v e  l a c k  o f  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  o f  
working age .  The d e c l i n i n g  b i r t h  r a t e  ha s  f a r  more t han  o f f s e t  
improving n o r t a l i t y  a s  f a r  a s  t h o s e  under  65 a r e  concerned.  I f  
t h e  m o r t a l i t y  and f e r t i l i t y  r a t e s  of  1957 (when t h e  baby boom was 
a t  i t s  peak) had c o n t i n u e d ,  p o p u l a t i o n  would be i n c r e a s i n g  a t  
a b o u t  2 p e r c e n t  p e r y e a r l a n d  t h e  r a t i o  o f  t h o s e  o v e r  65 t o  t h o s e  
20 t o  6 4  would have been much lower t h a n  w e  'now f i n d .  Table  2 
shows t h i s  r a t i o  f o r  v a r i o u s  r a t e s  of  i n c r e a s e  w i t h  t h e  p r e s e n t  
m o r t a l i t y  r a t e ,  a l o n g  w i t h  an  approximat ion by a  d e c l i n i n g  ex- 
p o n e n t i a l .  Such e x e r c i s e s  i n  comparat ive  s t a t i c s  a r e  u s e f u l  i f  
one  wishes  t o  s e p a r a t e  o u t  t h e  pu re  e f f e c t  of  n a t u r a l  i n c r e a s e  
from t h e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  m o r t a l i t y .  Permuting t h e  i n p u t  pa ramete r s  
i n  a  p r o j e c t i o n  i s  a  more d e t a i l e d  way of f o l l owing  up t h e  same 
s u b j e c t  ( K ey f i t z  1977: 1 6 8 ) .  
C o u n t r i e s  v a r y  g r e a t l y  i n  t h e  deg ree  t o  which t h e  r a t i o  o f  
p e r s o n s  a t  r e t i r e d  ag es  t o  t h o s e  a t  working ages  changes ove r  
t i m e .  I n  b o t h  Germany's and i n  A u s t r i a ,  F rance ,  and t h e  Uni ted  
Kingdom, t h e  i n c r e a s e  i s  sma l l ;  i n  Japan it i s  ve ry  l a r g e ,  go ing  
from 11 p e r c e n t  t o  2 4  p e r c e n t  i n  50 y e a r s .  T h i s  means t h a t  t h e  
c o s t  p e r  worker o f  p r o v i s i o n  f o r  o l d  age  i n  Japan w i l l  r ise  by 
140 p e r c e n t  f o r  demographic r e a sons  a lone .  R i s e s  n e a r l y  a s  sub- 
s t a n t i a l  a r e  shown f o r  Canada, Poland,  t h e  Ne the r l ands ,  and 
F in land .  
T a b l e  2. R a t i o  o f  p o p u l a t i o n  65 and o v e r  t o  t h a t  20 t o  64 a t  
l a s t  b i r t h d a y  f o r  v a r i o u s  r a t e s  r of i n c r e a s e ,  g iven  
U.S. m o r t a l i t y  o f  1978. 
S t a b l e  R a t i o  
(65+) / (20-64) 
Approximation 
by .239 e -32.4r  
The r ise  i s  p a r t l y  a t t r i b u t a b l e  t o  t h e  p r e s e n t  age d i s t r i -  
b u t i o n  and low b i r t h  r a t e s ,  p a r t l y  t o  t h e  assumed d r o p  o f  t h e  
b i r t h  r a t e  t o  b a r e  r ep lacement  and s u b s e q u e n t l y  o f  t h e  popula-  
t i o n  t o  s t a t i o n a r i t y .  We can  be s u r e  t h a t  s t a t i o n a r i t y  i s  a l -  
r eady  n e a r l y  w i t h  u s  i n  i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  c o u n t r i e s  and w i l l  e x t e n d  
t o  t h e  wor ld  a s  a  whole. The r a p i d  i n c r e a s e  o f  p o p u l a t i o n  t h a t  
made p o s s i b l e  t h e  low c o s t s  o f  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  w e  have had i n  
t h e  p a s t  i s  t r a n s i t o r y .  Once w e  see t h a t  t h e  s t a t i o n a r y  r a t h e r  
t h a n  t h e  i n c r e a s i n g  p o p u l a t i o n  i s t h e  normal c o n d i t i o n ,  t h e n  it  
becomes c l e a r  t h a t  w e  have been p l a y i n g  a  c h a i n - l e t t e r  game, and 
l i k e  a l l  s u c h  games t h a t  depend on e v e r  more p a r t i c i p a n t s ,  t h i s  
one  had t o  come t o  a n  end sooner  o r  l a t e r .  
D e s p i t e  c o n s i d e r a b l e  v a r i a t i o n  among c o u n t r i e s  some c l e a r  
o v e r a l l  t e n d e n c i e s  a p p e a r  f o r  17 i n d u s t r i a l  c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  have 
been t a b u l a t e d  by L u i s  C a s t r o .  With t h e  f a l l i n g  r a t e s  p r o j e c t i o n s  
t h e  unweighted mean r a t i o  of  r e t i r e d  t o  working age  p o p u l a t i o n  
f o r  t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s  goes from 18.5 p e r c e n t  i n  1973 t o  26.3 i n  
2025, t h e  l a r g e r  p a r t  o f  t h e  i n c r e a s e  o c c u r r i n g  i n  t h e  2 1 s t  cen- 
t u r y ,  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  t o  t h e  baby boom's a r r i v a l  a t  r e t i r e m e n t  age .  
The numbers t r a n s l a t e  d i r e c t l y  i n t o  d o l l a r s ,  yen ,  deu t sche-  
marks, e t c .  I f  r e t i r e m e n t  was a t  age  65 f o r  a l l ,  and c o n t r i b u -  
t i o n s  w e r e  from a g e  15 t o  64 ( t o o  l o n g  a  p e r i o d  f o r  most  c o u n t r i e s ,  
and s h o r t e n i n g  it would i n c r e a s e  c o s t ) ,  and i f  t h e  r e t i r e m e n t  
income was t o  be  e q u a l  t o  t h e  ( supposed ly  uni form f o r  t h e  p r e s e n t  
argument)  wage, t h e n  i n  1975 f o r  Japan 11.5 p e r c e n t  o f  c u r r e n t  
wages would s u f f i c e  f o r  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  t a x e s ;  i n  t h e  y e a r  2000 
20.1 p e r c e n t  would be n e c e s s a r y ,  i n  t h e  y e a r  2025, 27.3 p e r c e n t .  
P l a i n l y  no s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  scheme w i l l  r e p l a c e  100 p e r c e n t  of  
wage income; i f  it i s  t o  r e p l a c e  h a l f  of  income, t h e n  t h e s e  num- 
b e r s  a r e  t o  be d i v i d e d  by two. Even s o  h a l f  of  27.3 i s  13.6 
p e r c e n t ,  which i s  l a r g e  enough. W e  s h o u l d  be  a b l e  t o  f i n d  s u r v e y  
d a t a  i n  t h e  s e v e r a l  c o u n t r i e s  g i v i n g  a t t i t u d e s  o f  t h e  young gen- 
e r a t i o n s  t o  e v e r  r i s i n g  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  t a x e s .  
W e  have s t u d i e d  demographic e f f e c t s  i n  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  by 
t h e  r a t i o  o f t h e  o l d  p o p u l a t i o n  t o  t h a t  of working a g e ,  i . e . ,  
t h e  r a t i o  o f  t h o s e  65 and o v e r  t o  t h o s e  20 t o  64. No one assumes 
t h a t  t h e  l a t t e r  a r e  a l l  working o r  t h e  former  a l l  r e t i r e d ,  b u t  
n o n e t h e l e s s  w e  u s e  t h e s e  a s  i n d e x e s  o f  t h e  two s u b p o p u l a t i o n s .  
W e  c a n  do much b e t t e r  by r e c o g n i z i n g  more age  g roups ,  and 
u s i n g  p a s t  and p r o j e c t e d  l a b o r  f o r c e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  r a t e s .  Ex- 
p e r i m e n t s  a r e p o s s i b l e  t o  f i n d  what i s  t h e  e f f e c t  on s o c i a l  s e c u r -  
i t y  c o s t s  and c o n t r i b u t i o n s  o f  changed p a r t i c i p a t i o n ,  d i f f e r e n t  
m o r t a l i t y ,  d i f f e r e n t  f e r t i l i t y .  I f  d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  r a t e s  o f  any 
o f  t h e s e  e x i s t  f o r  r u r a l  and urban t h a t  c a n  be t a k e n  i n t o  a c c o u n t  
a s  w e l l .  A l l  t h i s  i s  p o s s i b l e  on t h e  b a s e  o f  t h e  d a t a  and pro- 
grams now a v a i l a b l e  f o r  many c o u n t r i e s  of  Europe and America. 
When p o p u l a t i o n s  a r e  i n c r e a s i n g  r a p i d l y  t h e  r a t i o  o f  t h e  
r e t i r e d  t o  t h e  working p o p u l a t i o n  depends much more on long- term 
f e r t i l i t y  r a t e s  t h a n  on m o r t a l i t y .  I n  t h e  r a t i o  B = R/L, where 
R a r e  t h e  r e t i r e d ,  L  t h e  l a b o r  f o r c e ,  B t h e  burden,  t h e  denomi- 
n a t o r  i s  more e a s i l y  i n f l u e n c e d  t h a n  t h e  numerator .  But when 
s t a t i o n a r i t y  i s  approached t h i s  i s  less t r u e ;  g r e a t e r  l o n g e v i t y  
t h e n  h a s  a  major  e f f e c t .  Very s i m p l e  exper iments  w i l l  d i s c l o s e  
t h i s  e f f e c t .  
Pending such  exper iments  some i l l u s t r a t i v e  numbers may be  
u s e f u l .  I n  a  p o p u l a t i o n  i n c r e a s i n g  a t  3  p e r c e n t  p e r  y e a r  t h e  
r a t i o  B might  be .07; w i t h  a  d r o p  t o  s t a t i o n a r i t y  t h a t  r a t i o  c a n  
e a s i l y  r ise  t o  .25.  To o b t a i n  t h e  same B = .25 by a n  i n c r e a s e  
o f  e x p e c t a t i o n  a t  age  65 a l o n e  i n  a  p o p u l a t i o n  growing a t  3  p e r c e n t  
p e r  y e a r  would r e q u i r e  t h a t  e x p e c t a t i o n  t o  m u l t i p l y  by 3 o r  more, 
i . e . ,  an e x p e c t a t i o n  a t  age  65 o f  a b o u t  4 0  y e a r s !  The moderate 
improvements,  s a y  1 y e a r  p e r  decade  i n  = 65,  a r e  f o r  a  long  
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t i m e  going  t o  be  a  much s m a l l e r  f a c t o r  i n  r i s i n g  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  
c o s t s  t h a n  t h e  f a l l i n g  b i r t h  r a t e ,  a c t i n g  on t h e  s i z e  o f  t h e  
l a b o r  f o r c e .  W e  need more p r e c i s e  i n f o r m a t i o n  on t h i s  e f f e c t  i n  
t e r m s  o f  t h e  m o r t a l i t y  and f e r t i l i t y  s c h e d u l e s  of  s e v e r a l  coun- 
t r ies .  
W e  a l s o  need more knowledge o f  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  r e t i r e m e n t .  
The a g e o f  r e t i r e m e n t  h a s  been d ropp ing ,  p a r t l y  encouraged i n  t h i s  
by t h e  p r o v i s i o n  o f  more generous  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  improvements 
add n o t  o n l y  t h e i r  o w n ' c o s t s  t o  t h e  budge t  b u t  a l s o  t h e  a d d i t i o n a l  
c o s t  a r i s i n g  from t h e  e a r l i e r  r e t i r e m e n t s  t h a t  r e s u l t  from t h e s e  
improvements.  For Swedish men w e  have ( A r t l e  1980:lO) t h e  pa r -  
t i c i p a t i o n  r a t e s  
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which makes c l e a r  t h e  e f f e c t  of  t h e  age 65 s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  bene- 
f i t .  Any doub t  on t h i s  i s  r e s o l v e d  by t h e  g r e a t  d r o p  i n  p a r t i c i -  
p a t i o n  t h a t  o c c u r r e d  when t h e  pens ion  age  was lowered from 67 t o  
65 i n  1976. Exper iments  on v a r i o u s  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  s c h e d u l e s  f o r  
t h e  f u t u r e  w i l l  show how i n f l u e n t i a l  i s  t h i s  v a r i a b l e  i n  r e l a t i o n  
t o  m o r t a l i t y  and f e r t i l i t y .  
There  i s  c l e a r l y  a  l i m i t  t o  t h e  d e g r e e  i n  which o l d e r  peop le  
w i l l  be s u p p o r t e d ,  and one s u s p e c t s  t h a t  a  rise i n  t h e  p e n s i o n  
age  w i l l  be more and more d i s c u s s e d .  The improvement of m o r t a l i t y  
can  be  t h o u g h t  o f  a s  a  g i f t  t o  o l d e r  peop le .  I n  1940 865 was 12 
y e a r s  i n  t h e  U.S.; i n  1980 it i s  a b o u t  16 y e a r s .  Thus i n  1940 t h e  
person o f  p e n s i o n a b l e  age  cou ld  e x p e c t  t o  l i v e  t o  77; i n  1980 he  
c o u l d  e x p e c t  t o  l i v e  t o  81. Should w e  n o t  c o u n t  backwards from 
t h e s e  a g e s  and s a y  t h a t  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  i s  j u s t  a s  generous  i n  
1980 a s  i n  1940 i f  it p r o v i d e s  12 y e a r s  o f  b e n e f i t  on t h e  aver -  
age?  On t h a t  c o n d i t i o n  t h e  pens ion  age would go w i t h  e x p e c t a t i o n  
and would be 81-12 = 69 i n  1980. O r  perhaps  a  compromise c o u l d  
be  p r o v i d e d ,  by which h a l f  of  t h e  i n c r e a s e d  e x p e c t a t i o n  would be 
t a k e n  o u t  i n  work, h a l f  i n  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y - f u n d e d  l e i s u r e .  
Again n a t i o n a l  m a t e r i a l s  can  t e l l  u s  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  impl ica -  
t i o n s  o f  t h e s e  o p t i o n s .  
TWO WAYS OF PROVIDING FOR OLD AGE 
Enough f o r  t h e  demographic p r e l i m i n a r i e s  and t h e  l e g i s l a t i o n .  
W e  need now some t h e o r y  of  t h e  two ways i n  which s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  
can  i n  p r i n c i p l e  be  p r o v i d e d .  These a r e  i l l u s t r a t e d  by t h e  two 
p r i n c i p a l  p e r s p e c t i v e s  o f  t h e  L e x i s  d iagram on which c o n t r i b u t i o n s  
and b e n e f i t s  may be p o r t r a y e d .  
Each c o h o r t  l o o k s  a f t e r  i t s e l f .  The method o b t a i n s  t h e  
advan tage  o f  i n t e r e s t  t o  r e d u c e  c o s t ;  t h e  working p e o p l e  
who s a v e  th rough  t h e  scheme o b t a i n  a  s h a r e  i n  t h e  econ- 
omy a s i d e  from t h e i r  jobs ;  t h a t  one c o h o r t  i s  l a r g e  and 
a n o t h e r  i s  s m a l l  i s  i n  p r i n c i p l e  i n d i f f e r e n t  ( though w e  
s h a l l  have t o  q u a l i f y  t h i s  l a s t  a s s e r t i o n ) .  The method 
c a n n o t  e a s i l y  p r o t e c t  a g a i n s t  i n f l a t i o n ;  it r e q u i r e s  
some s t a b l e  r e p o s i t o r y  o f  v a l u e .  The u n i t  i s  t h e  group 
o f  p e o p l e  on e a c h  d i a g o n a l  s t r i p  o f  t h e  L e x i s  diagram. 
2 .  Each t ime  p e r i o d  l o o k s  a f t e r  i t s e l f .  I n t e r e s t  does  n o t  
come i n t o  t h e  m a t t e r ;  no fund i s  b u i l t  up;  changes i n  
c o h o r t  s i z e s  make f o r  awkward changes i n  c o s t ;  c o s t  be- 
comes g r e a t  w i t h  t h e  approach o f  a  s t a t i o n a r y  p o p u l a t i o n  
and s t a t i o n a r y  economy. T r a n s f e r s  a r e  a l o n g  h o r i z o n t a l  
l i n e s  i n  t h e  d iagram.  T h i s  pay-as-you-go method i s  i n -  
f l a t i o n  proof  s i n c e  t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  o f  e a c h  moment 
a r e  p a i d  o u t  v e r y  soon a f t e r  c o l l e c t i o n  t o  t h e  o l d  peo- 
p l e  o f  t h e  moment. J u s t  a f t e r  a  baby boom t h e  method 
i s  cheap ,  s i n c e  t h e  c o n t r i b u t o r s  i n c r e a s e  s o o n e r  t h a n  
b e n e f i c i a r i e s .  I n  t h e  same way a  c h a i n  l e t t e r  p r o v i d e s  
rewards  t o  r a p i d  i n c r e a s e .  I n  a  c h a i n  l e t t e r  t h e  suc-  
c e s s i v e  " g e n e r a t i o n s "  a r e  s e p a r a t e d  o n l y  by days  o r  weeks 
r a t h e r  t h a n  by many y e a r s .  Tha t  r a p i d  growth s o l v e s  many 
problems i s  e v i d e n t ,  bu t  i t  i s  e q u a l l y  e v i d e n t  t h a t  
t h e r e  a r e  l i m i t s  t o  t h e  l eng th  of  time over  which we 
can t a k e  advantage of t h i s  k ind of s o l u t i o n .  
To s tudy  t h e  demographics o f  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  we need expres-  
s i o n s  f o r  t h e  premium on funded and unfunded schemes, a s  w e l l  a s  
t he  r e s e r v e  t h a t  i s  r e q u i r e d  on t h e  funded scheme. These w i l l  be 
worked o u t ,  r e l y i n g  where need be on s t a b l e  popula t ion  theory .  
I n  t h i s  approximation we w i l l  t h ink  of  t h e  ages  20 t o  6 4  and 65 
and over a s  working and r e t i r e d ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  No assumption i s  
made t h a t  a l l  t h o s e  under 65 a r e  working, nor t h a t  a l l  t hose  65 
and over  a r e  r e t i r e d ;  we t a k e  t h e s e  ages  only  t o  o b t a i n  t h e  demo- 
graphic  e f f e c t .  La t e r  s tudy  w i l l  apply  l a b o r  f o r c e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  
r a t e s  age by age and permi t  examination of t h e  nondemographic 
e lements .  
For t h e  unfunded scheme, i n  which t h e  p r e s e n t l y  working 
suppor t  t hose  who a r e  p r e s e n t l y  r e t i r e d ,  f o r  each u n i t  o f  b e n e f i t  
t o  every o l d  person t h e  t o t a l  b e n e f i t  w i l l  be e  - r a  R ( a ) d a ,  and 
- 
n % e - r a  JB R ( a ) d a  working people c o n t r i b u t e ,  s o  t h e  c o s t  t o  each w i l l  
be 
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where R ( a )  i s  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  of su rv iv ing  from b i r t h  t o  age a ,  
a is  t h e  age of s t a r t i n g  work, B i s  t h e  age of r e t i r e m e n t ,  w i s  
t h e  h i g h e s t  age t o  which anyone l i v e s ,  and r i s  t h e  r a t i o  o f  
i n c r e a s e .  
I t  i s  no t  immediately obvious t h a t  t h i s  i s  a  dec reas ing  func- 
t i o n  of r ,  b u t  we can prove t h a t  a t  t h e  same time a s  we f i n d  a  
convenient  approximation.  D i f f e r e n t i a t i n g  by t h e  theory  of i m -  
p l i c i t  f unc t ions  g i v e s  wi thout  approximation 
where m i s  t h e  mean age  o f  t h e  r e t i r e d  and mw t h e  mean age  o f  
r 
t h e  working p o p u l a t i o n .  By i n t e g r a t i n g  back a s  though mr and m 
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w e r e  c o n s t a n t ,  w e  have 
Po b e i n g  t h e  premium i n  t h e  l i f e  t a b l e  o r  s t a t i o n a r y  p o p u l a t i o n .  
T h i s  a l s o  i s  e x a c t .  S i n c e  t h e  mean age  of  t h o s e  working i s  nec- 
e s s a r i l y  younger t h a n  t h e  mean age of t h e  r e t i r e d ,  t h e  d e c l i n e  
of  pr w i t h  age  i s  proved.  How f a s t  t h i s  d e c l i n e  o c c u r s  a s  popu- 
l a t i o n  growth rises i s  s e e n  i n  Tab le  2  above,  f o r  a  p o p u l a t i o n  
i n  which 8 = 70,  mw = 38,  mr = 70, a = 20, B = 65, and po = .239. 
0 
For a  p o p u l a t i o n  i n c r e a s i n g  a t  2  p e r c e n t  p e r  y e a r ,  t h e  c o s t  i s  
j u s t  h a l f  of  what it i s  f o r  a  s t a t i o n a r y  p o p u l a t i o n .  
For a  funded a n n u i t y  t h e  c o s t  may b e  o b t a i n e d  by d i s c o u n t i n g  
back t o  age  z e r o  t h e  expec ted  b e n e f i t  f o r  an  i n d i v i d u a l ,  i . e . ,  
R ( a ) d a ,  and e q u a t i n g  t h i s  t o  t h e  p a y m e n t s t h e  p e r s o n  w i l l  
- i a  be  e x p e c t e d  t o  make w h i l e  he  i s  working a g e ,  ~ i l  2  ( a ) d a ,  
where t h e  symbols a r e  t h o s e  used i n  t h e  d e r i v a t i o n  of  ( 1 )  and i 
i s  t h e  r a t e  o f  i n t e r e s t .  The premium t h a t  comes o u t  o f  t h i s  
e q u a t i o n  i s  
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Express ion  ( 2 )  i s  i d e n t i c a l  w i t h  ( 1 )  e x c e p t  t h a t  i t  c o n t a i n s  t h e  
r a t e  o f  i n t e r e s t  i i n  t h e  same p l a c e  where ( 1 )  c o n t a i n s  t h e  r a t e  
o f  i n c r e a s e  r .  Thus T a b l e  2  a l s o  s e r v e s  t o  show how pi goes down 
w i t h  i n c r e a s e  o f  t h e  r a t e  o f  i n t e r e s t .  With 3  p e r c e n t  i n t e r e s t ,  
o f t e n  t a k e n  a s  t h e  l o n g  t e r m  r a t e  f o r  t h e  economy, i t  c o s t s  only  
a  l i t t l e  more t h a n  one t h i r d  a s  much t o  p r o v i d e  f o r  o n e ' s  o l d  
a g e  a s  i f  no i n t e r e s t  i s  p a i d .  The p o i n t  i s  i m p o r t a n t ,  s i n c e  
e v i d e n t l y  f o r  a  s t a t i o n a r y  p o p u l a t i o n  and economy pay-as-you-go 
i s  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  s a v i n g  f o r  o n e ' s  o l d  age  w i t h o u t  i n t e r e s t .  
When only  a  few i n d i v i d u a l s  make p rov i s ion  f o r  t h e i r  o l d  
age through funded schemes, t h e i r  s av ings  do n o t  g r e a t l y  a f f e c t  
t h e  f i n a n c i a l  markets through which they  go. But when a  funded 
scheme a p p l i e s  t o  an e n t i r e  popula t ion  one cannot  suppose t h a t  
i t s  r e s e r v e s  w i l l  simply d i sappea r  i n t o  t h e  l a r g e r  sav ing  and 
investment  p rocess .  Let  us  s e e  how l a r g e  t h e  r e s e r v e  w i l l  be ,  
aga in  on t h e  s t a b l e  model. 
For each i n d i v i d u a l  c u r r e n t l y  i n  t h e  c o n t r i b u t i n g  age group 
t h e  fund w i l l  r e c e i v e  pi each year .  Per i n d i v i d u a l  i n  t h e  con- 
t r i b u t i n g  group it w i l l  pay o u t  pr each y e a r .  Thus it w i l l  
accumulate a s  r e s e r v e  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  pi - pr.  I f  t h e  r a t e  of 
popu la t ion  growth is  g r e a t e r  than  t h e  r a t e  of  i n t e r e s t  t h i s  w i l l  
be p o s i t i v e ,  b u t  i n  t h e  more l i k e l y  c i rcumstances  t h a t  t h e  r a t e  
of  i n t e r e s t  i s  g r e a t e r  it w i l l  be nega t ive .  When t h i s  l a t t e r  i s  
t h e  ca se  t h e  fund r e l i e v e s  c o n t r i b u t o r s  of  p a r t  of  t h e  c o s t  of 
t h e i r  pensions .  
The amount can be s u b s t a n t i a l .  Thus c o n s u l t i n g  Table 1 
aga in ,  we s e e  t h a t  i f  t h e  r a t e  of i n t e r e s t  i s  3 p e r c e n t  and t h e  
growth of  t h e  popu la t ion  i s  1 p e r c e n t ,  then  pay-as-you-go w i l l  
c o s t  2 4  c e n t s  f o r  each d o l l a r  of pension and t h e  funded scheme 
w i l l  c o s t  only  9 c e n t s .  
But our  o r i g i n a l  and important  q u e s t i o n  i s  how l a r g e  t h e  
fund has  t o  be .  I f  t h e  s i z e  of t h e  fund i s  f  p e r  person of work- 
i n g  age then  annual  i n t e r e s t  drawn on it, f i ,  l e s s  p rov i s ion  f o r  
t h e  increment of  p o p u l a t i o n , f r ,  must be equa l  t o  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  
Pr ' Pi- Th i s  g i v e s  f o r  t h e  fund pe r  person of  working age 
For t h o s e  who f i n d  t h i s  argument r e s t r i c t i v e  an a l t e r n a t i v e  
s t a t emen t  i s  a v a i l a b l e .  Per person i n  t h e  working popula t ion  
t h e  amount t h a t  would be pa id  o u t  each yea r  would be p  a s  shown 
r 
i n  ( 1 ) .  Per person i n  t h e  working popu la t ion  t h e  amount c o l l e c -  
t e d  each y e a r  would be pi ,  t h e  premium a s  shown i n  ( 2 ) .  Thus i n  
r e s p e c t  of  each person i n  t h e  working popu la t ion ,  a f t e r  t h e  
scheme has  been i n  e x i s t e n c e  long enough and t h e  c o n d i t i o n  of  
s t a b i l i t y  i s  s a t i s f i e d ,  we would have an a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  r e s e r v e  
I f  t h i s  annual  amount has been c o l l e c t e d  cont inuous ly  f o r  
a  long t i m e  from each person working, i . e . ,  from when t h e  popu- 
l a t i o n  was of  n e g l i g i b l e  s i z e ,  and i f  it has been accumulating 
i n t e r e s t  a t  r a t e  i,  then  we can r e a d i l y  f i n d  t h e  t o t a l  now i n  
t h e  r e s e r v e ,  a l l  p e r  person now working. Consider a  time t y e a r s  
back. The number of  people  i n  t h e  working popula t ion  p e r  person 
working now would have been e-rt ,  and accumulation o f  i n t e r e s t  
would i n c r e a s e  each d o l l a r  c o l l e c t e d  t o  eit  d o l l a r s .  A l l  w e  need 
do i s  add over  t t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  (pi - pr) e-rt eit t o  f i n d  
- ( r - F )  ttd Pi - Pr 
- 
0 r - i  
This  q u a n t i t y  must be p o s i t i v e ,  s i n c e  i f  r > i t hen  pr C pi and 
v i c e  ve r sa .  
I n  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  t h a t  w i l l  be impor tan t  i n  t h e  f u t u r e  t h e  
popula t ion  w i l l  be s t a t i o n a r y ,  and l e t  us say  t h a t  t h e  r e a l  r a t e  
of  i n t e r e s t  w i l l  be 3 pe rcen t .  Then aga in  from Table 2 we have 
which i s  t o  say  t h a t  t h e  r e s e r v e  i s  5 t i m e s  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  annual  
pension.  For i = . 0 4  w e  o b t a i n  i n  t h e  same way 
To g e n e r a l i z e  t h e  r e s u l t  t o  pensions  t h a t  a r e  n o t  equa l  t o  
t h e  s a l a r y ,  bu t  some f r a c t i o n  t h e r e o f ,  say 60 p e r c e n t ,  we simply 
t a k e  60 p e r c e n t  of t h e  s a l a r y  a s  t h e  u n i t  f o r  a l l  of  t h e  ca lcu-  
l a t i o n s  above. I n  s h o r t  w e  d i s r e g a r d  t h e  p a r t  of  t h e  s a l a r y  be- 
yond 60 pe rcen t .  That  i s  why we can say  t h a t  t h e  r e s e r v e  equa l s  
'i - 'r t i m e s  t h e  annual  pension,  wi thout  necessary  r e l a t i o n  t o  
- 
r - 1  
s a l a r y .  
I f  i = r t h e  e x p r e s s i o n  l o o k s  i n d e t e r m i n a t e ,  b u t  can  be 
shown t o  e q u a l  pi (mr - m w ) ,  where m i s  a g a i n  t h e  mean age  o f  
r 
t h o s e  r e t i r e d ,  mw t h e  mean age  o f  t h o s e  working.  I n  symbols ,  
t h e  d e s i r e d  l i m i t  i s  
i r  r - i  d r 
I f  i # r ,  a s  Pave1 K i t s u l  p o i n t s  o u t  t o  m e ,  t h e  e x p r e s s i o n  
f o r  t h e  r e s e r v e  i s  s t i l l  n e a r l y  e q u a l  t o  t h e  d e r i v a t i v e  o f  e i t h e r  
o f  t h e  t e r m s  i n  t h e  numera to r ,  t a k e n  a b o u t  a  p o i n t  midway between 
i and r ,  and w i t h  s i g n  r e v e r s e d .  The r e s e r v e  can  be w r i t t e n  
t e r m s  o f  f i r s t  and t h i r d  d e r i v a t i v e s  a t  t h e  mid-point  o f  t h e  p- 
f u n c t i o n :  
P  r - Pi r + i  
i - r  = - p f  ( ) -  ( r ; i j 2  
w e  check t h i s  w i t h  r = .02,  i = .04 t o  o b t a i n  
The t r u e  r e s e r v e  a t  t h e  v a l u e  .03 a s  shown i n  Tab le  3  f o r  r = .02 ,  
i = .04 i s  3.32,  and t h e  t h i r d  d e r i v a t i v e  c o v e r s  t h e  s m a l l  d i f f e r -  
ence .  
The q u a n t i t y  ( 4 )  i s  shown by .Table 3  t o  be between a b o u t  3  
and 8 f o r  a  l o w - m o r t a l i t y  p o p u l a t i o n .  Note t h a t  v a l u e s  i n  Tab le  
3 change l i t t l e  a l o n g  d i a g o n a l s  from lower  l e f t  t o  upper  r i g h t .  
Pi - Pr 
I n  s h o r t  t h e  r e s e r v e  - i s  v e r y  n e a r l y  a  f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  sum 
of r and i ,  w i t h  v a l u e s  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  a s  shown below 
Table 3 .  Reserve a s  m u l t i p l e  of  annual  pension,  f o r  v a r i o u s  
r a t e s  of insurance  and of i n t e r e s t ,  u s ing  ( 4 )  based 
on t h e  s t a b l e  r a t e  of i n c r e a s e ,  and t h e  Coale and 
Demeny West Male L i f e  Table w i th  & = 71.19. 0 
Thus we f i n d  t h a t  t h e  g r e a t e r  t h e  popula t ion  i n c r e a s e  t h e  l e s s  
t h e  r e s e r v e  needed; t h e  e f f e c t  of  i n c r e a s e  and i n t e r e s t  i s  t h e  
same, j u s t  a s  it was i n  t h e  de te rmina t ion  o f t h e  premium. 
The amount by which t h e  number 3 t o  7 i s  t o  be m u l t i p l i e d  i s  
n o t  t h e  wage, b u t  t h e  p a r t  o f t h e w a g e  t h a t  comes i n t o  t h e  scheme. 
I n  t h e  United S t a t e s  t h e  c c l l e c t i o n s  and disbursements  a r e  now 
about  t h e  $160 b i l l i o n  mark, s o  i f  t h e  whole scheme was funded 
t h e  r e s e r v e  would be about  one t r i l l i o n  d o l l a r s .  Complete fund- 
i n g  could be d i scussed  a t  t h e  i n i t i a t i o n  of  t h e  scheme b u t  i s  
ha rd ly  conce ivab le  now. 
The o b j e c t i o n  has  been r a i s e d  t h a t  it i s  imprac t i cab le  t o  
have any cons ide rab le  f r a c t i o n  of  such a l a r g e  fund i n  t h e  hands 
of t h e  government. How could it choose i m p a r t i a l l y  among t h e  
concerns i n  which it might i n v e s t ?  Would it s i n g l e  o u t  d e c l i n i n g  
s e c t o r s  o f  t h e  economy f o r  rescue  r a t h e r  than  s t i m u l a t i n g  t h e  
more dynamic ones? 
Does n o t  government ownership of t h e  s h a r e s  of  p r i v a t e  con- 
c e r n s  c o n s t i t u t e  soc i a l i sm?  And would t h e  t o t a l  amount of  s h a r e s  
and bonds, indeed t o t a l  wea l th ,  be adequate  t o  t h e  s i z e  of  fund 
t h a t  would accumulate (Bourgeois-Pichat ,  1978) ? 
Most such doubts  and f e a r s  a r e  shown t o  be groundless  by 
t h e  Swedish exper ience .  I t  has  had an e a r n i n g s - r e l a t e d  pension 
program, a second t i e r  on t o p  of t h e  f l a t  amount t h a t  everyone 
was e n t i t l e d  t o ,  s i n c e  1959. By 1978 it had accumula ted  131.5 
b i l l i o n  k ronor  (some $30 b i l l i o n s ) ,  o v e r  1/3 o f  a n n u a l  GNP. T h a t  
fund i s  now t h e  major  s o u r c e  of  c a p i t a l  f o r m a t i o n  i n  Sweden and 
must have a t  l e a s t  p a r t  o f  t h e  c r e d i t  f o r  Sweden's p a s s i n g  t h e  
Uni ted  S t a t e s  i n  income p e r  head. 
To p r e v e n t  any group from hav ing  t o o  l a r g e  an  i n f l u e n c e  on 
i n v e s t m e n t ,  t h e  f u n d ' s  a s s e t s  a r e  a d m i n i s t e r e d  by f o u r  d i f f e r e n t  
boards .  One o f  t h e s e ,  t h e  F o u r t h  Fund Board, i n v e s t s  i n  s h a r e s  
o f  p r i v a t e  companies.  I n  some y e a r s  t h e  r e t u r n s  w e r e  e q u a l  t o  
t h e  r a t e  o f  i n f l a t i o n ,  i n  o t h e r  y e a r s  somewhat below. Promis- 
s o r y  n o t e s  o f  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  and i n d i v i d u a l s  f o r  house b u i l d -  
i n g  and o t h e r  p r o j e c t s ,  have  t a k e n  up much of a l l  f o u r  funds  
(McArdle 1979:G7). 
A s  f a r  a s  c a p i t a l  marke t s  a r e  concerned ,  it does  n o t  make 
much d i f f e r e n c e  whether  t h e  government r u n s  a  budge t  s u r p l u s  of 
1  p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  n a t i o n a l  income, o r  i n d i v i d u a l s  s a v i n g  1  per-  
c e n t  o f  t h e  n a t i o n a l  income. E i t h e r  way t h e  same amount i s  
a v a i l a b l e  f o r  i n v e s t m e n t .  The government ' s  budget  s u r p l u s  would 
be  used t o  pay o f f  t h e  n a t i o n a l  d e b t ,  and t h e  i n d i v i d u a l s  whose 
bonds were c a l l e d  f o r  repayment would seek  a  new i n v e s t m e n t  o f  
t h e  funds .  But  though t h e  economic e f f e c t s  o f  t h e  two k i n d s  o f  
saving-governmental  and p r i v a t e - a r e  s i m i l a r ,  t h e y  a r e  s e e n  ve ry  
d i f f e r e n t l y  by t h e  c i t i z e n .  The money t h a t  he sets a s i d e  i s  h i s  
own n e s t  egg;  t h e  money he pays  i n  t a x e s  i s  gone. I t  i s  v a i n  t o  
t e l l  him t h a t  t h e  e f f e c t  on t h e  economy i s  t h e  same; he  looks  w i t h  
a  k i n d e r  eye  on a n  accumula t ion  i n  h i s  own name, even one made 
under compulsion,  even  though t h e  u l t i m a t e  e f f e c t  on h i s  w e l f a r e  
may be t h e  same. 
DIFFERENT BOOKKEEPING I N  FREE ENTERPRISE AND SOCIALIST SOCIETIES 
The changing r a t i o  o f  p e o p l e  o f  r e t i r e d  age ( s a y ,  65 and 
o v e r )  t o  t h o s e  o f  working age  i s  bound t o  a f f e c t  a l l  c o u n t r i e s .  
T h a t  r a t i o  h a s  gone from a b o u t  10 p e r c e n t  t o  18 p e r c e n t  i n  t h e  
Uni ted  S t a t e s  between 1940 and 1980, and it w i l l  r ise  a lmos t  t o  
30 p e r c e n t  by 2 0 2 5 .  I n  B r a z i l  it i s  a s  low a s  5  p e r c e n t  b u t  w i l l  
r ise  a s  t h e  b i r t h  r a t e  f a l l s .  The USSR i s  going  th rough  a n  evo- 
l u t i o n  s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  o f  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s ,  and Sweden shows 
t h e  change even more s t r i k i n g l y .  
While t h e  u l t i m a t e  e f f e c t  of t h i s  i s  everywhere t h e  same- 
fewer workers t o  suppor t  each r e t i r e d  person- i t  shows i t s e l f  i n  
d i f f e r e n t  ways, depending on such t h i n g s  a s  t h e  s t a t e  bookkeep- 
i n g  system. I n  t h e  United S t a t e s  t h e  succes s ive  t h rea t ened  
bankruptc ies  of  t h e  S o c i a l  S e c u r i t y  T r u s t  Fund i s  t h e  a s p e c t  t h e  
p u b l i c  and l e g i s l a t o r s  a r e  a l l  too  f a m i l i a r  w i th .  Each t ime t h e  
fund i s  rev ived  by a  r i s e  i n  t h e  t a x  accompanied by o p t i m i s t i c  
pronouncements about  subsequent solvency.  Very soon Congress 
w i l l  have t o  a c t  a g a i n ,  o r  o l d  people w i l l  n o t  r e c e i v e  t h e i r  
checks. 
Other c o u n t r i e s  have no s p e c i f i c  t a x  bu t  simply t a k e  payments 
o u t  of  t h e  n a t i o n a l  budget. This means t h a t  t h e  demographically 
engendered c r i s i s  does n o t  show i t s e l f  s o  s h a r p l y  and indeed can 
be covered over  a  cons ide rab le  t ime a t  t h e  c o s t  of  o t h e r  i t ems  i n  
t h e  budget .  I n  a  s o c i a l i s t  s t a t e  where t h e  budget covers  a l l  of 
t h e  n a t i o n ' s  p roduc t ive  a c t i v i t i e s ,  t h i s  c a p a c i t y  t o  cover  up t h e  
immediate e f f e c t  i s  e s p e c i a l l y  g r e a t .  Yet somehow t h e  i s s u e  must 
be met, and t h e  i n c r e a s i n g  c o s t  consciousness  i n  a l l  c o u n t r i e s  
c o n s t i t u t e s  p r e s s u r e  t o  make t h e  c o s t s  e x p l i c i t .  
I f  one goes t o  t h e  extreme of an economy i n  which t h e  pro- 
d u c t  i s  d iv ided  e q u a l l y  among t h e  e n t i r e  popula t ion ,  then  i f  we 
a b s t r a c t  from o t h e r  changes,  a  l a r g e r  number of non-workers w i l l  
mean a f a l l i n g  s t anda rd  o f  l i v i n g .  A s o c i e t y  f a c i n g  t h i s  would 
want t o  even t h i n g s  o u t  and might w e l l  accep t  more s av ings  ahead 
of t ime s o  a s  t o  i n c r e a s e  i t s  c a p i t a l  s tock  and p reven t  t h e  f a l l .  
Typica l ly  a  s o c i e t y  would have many o p p o r t u n i t i e s  f o r  investment  
of s av ings ,  and t h e  r e t u r n  on investment  would h e l p  suppor t  t h e  
o l d .  With even 3  p e r c e n t  r e t u r n  each d o l l a r  o r  r u b l e  of sav ing  
would provide 2  d o l l a r s  o r  r u b l e s  2 3  y e a r s  l a t e r .  
D i f f e r e n t  c o u n t r i e s  have d i f f e r e n t  ways o f  keeping t h e  ac- 
counts ,  and bookkeeping has  much e f f e c t  on t h e  way t h e  problem 
i s  perce ived .  With a  funded scheme t h e  f u t u r e  o l d  people as  a 
c o h o r t  s e t  a s i d e  money r e sou rces  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  p h y s i c a l  c a p i t a l .  
The s o c i e t y  i s  then  doing what an i n d i v i d u a l  does when he b u i l d s  
a  house d u r a b l e  enough t o  l i v e  i n  through h i s  o l d  age.  Some 
such p h y s i c a l  sav ing  everyone does-one has  c l o t h e s ,  perhaps  an 
automobile,  o f t e n  a  house o r  some e q u i t y  i n  one. 
Y e t  because  w e  a l l  r e q u i r e  non-durable goods a s  w e l l ,  physi -  
c a l  s a v i n g  i s  no complete s o l u t i o n  f o r  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l .  Samuelson 
shows t h a t  p e r i s h a b l e  goods r e q u i r e  some k ind  o f  s o c i a l  s o l u t i o n .  
I f  working l i f e  i s  i n  two o r  more p e r i o d s  one can b r i b e  younger 
workers t o  s u p p o r t  one. I f  it is  o n l y  one p e r i o d ,  even t h a t  i s  
n o t  p o s s i b l e ,  and o n l y  a  f i a t  o f t h e  community can  e n s u r e  t h e  con- 
sumption o f  t h e  o l d .  
Y e t  t h i s  s o l u t i o n ,  embodied i n  t h e  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  l e g i s l a -  
t i o n  of most advanced c o u n t r i e s ,  p l a n t s  t h e  seeds  o f  i n t e r g e n e r -  
a t i o n a l  d i s c o r d ,  W e  need t o  compare w i t h  p o p u l a t i o n s  t h a t  grew 
q u i c k l y  w i th  h igh  m o r t a l i t y .  I n  one i n s t a n c e  t h e  young might  
have been suppor ted  by t h e i r  p a r e n t s  f o r  15 y e a r s  and t h e  p a r e n t s  
l a t e r  r e q u i r e d  s u p p o r t  f o r  10 y e a r s .  But i n  o t h e r  c a s e s  t h e  
young might  be suppor ted  f o r  20 y e a r s  and t h e  o l d  ( a t  h ighe r  c o s t  
p e r  person-year)  a l s o  f o r  20 y e a r s ,  a  ve ry  d i f f e r e n t  r a t i o .  W e  
need t o  look i n t o  t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  s o c i a l  d e c i s i o n  on t h e  l e n g t h  
o f  t i m e  t h e  o l d  a r e  e n t i t l e d  t o  be looked a f t e r .  Moreover t h e  
c a r e  o f  t h e  young i s  d e c e n t r a l i z e d  i n t o  f a m i l i e s ;  t h e  c o l l e c t i v -  
i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  c a r e  o f  t h e  o l d  makes it seem a  h e a v i e r  burden.  
W e  t h u s  m e e t  t h e  problem o f  t i m e  i n  its a c u t e s t  forms when 
w e  c o n s i d e r  t h e  s e v e r a l  i n t e r g e n e r a t i o n a l  t r a n s f e r s .  I f  goods 
have no keeping q u a l i t i e s ,  t hen  one i s  d r i v e n  t o  a  s o c i a l  so lu -  
t i o n ;  each t i m e  p e r i o d  must ba lance  i t s  books; t h e  o l d  can  on ly  
l i v e  o f f  c u r r e n t  work. I f  goods keep one e scapes  from t h i s  d i -  
lemma, b u t  n o t  a l l  o f  t hegoods  needed f o r  s u b s i s t e n c e  keep,  and 
i n  p a r t i c u l a r  food does  n o t  keep. A s o c i a l  s o l u t i o n  i s  a g a i n  
neces sa ry ,  b u t  now it can  be a r r anged  v i a  c a p i t a l  goods t h a t  
keep and reproduce s o  t h a t  t h e  books can  be ba lanced  b o t h  i n  each 
p e r i o d  and f o r  e ach  c o h o r t .  
LIMITS ON THE INDEPENDENCE OF COHORTS 
S ince  a  main argument f o r  t h e  funded scheme i s  t h a t  each 
c o h o r t  i s  independent  of  t h e  o t h e r s ,  w e  need t o  look more c l o s e l y  
i n t o  t h e  degree  t o  which t h i s  can be  s o .  I t  would be p o s s i b l e  
i f  t h e  working popu la t i on  produced t h e  a c t u a l  p h y s i c a l  goods on 
which they  would l i v e  i n  t h e i r  o l d  age ,  i f  t h e y  cou ld  make t h e  
c l o t h i n g ,  b u i l d  t h e  houses ,  bake t h e  Sread ,  t h a t  they  would u se  
when t h ey  were p a s t  6 5 .  I n s o f a r  a s  t h e y  canno t  do t h a t ,  t h ey  
w i l l  have t o  depend on t h o s e  c u r r e n t l y  i n  t h e  l a b o r  f o r c e .  Th i s  
dependency i s  i n e v i t a b l e  f o r  b r ead ,  a v o i d a b l e  f o r  houses .  
F a i l i n g  such  s av i n g  i n  k ind  a r e  w e  merely  d i s c u s s i n g  f i nan -  
c i a l  p r o v i s i o n  when w e  a r gue  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  between funded and 
pay-as-you-go? Whatever t h e  f i n a n c i a l  a s p e c t s ,  i t  i s  s a i d  t h a t  
goods consumed i n  1980 a r e  produced by t h e  l a b o r  f o r c e  of  1980, 
and t h i s  t r a n s f e r  o f  goods i s  t h e  on ly  way t h a t  t h e  o l d  peop le  
o f  1980 can  be su p p o r t ed .  
Y e t  s t i l l  keeping t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  c l o s e  t o  r e a l  goods, t h a t  
must be q u a l i f i e d .  A man d u r i n g  h i s  working y e a r s  can  b u i l d  a  
house t h a t  i s  more d u r a b l e  t h a n  he c u r r e n t l y  needs and t h a t  w i l l  
l a s t  him i n t o  h i s  o l d  age .  But i n  an  exchange economy he  does  
n o t  need t o  b u i l d  t h e  v e r y  house i n  which h e  w i l l  l i v e ;  he  can  
perform s e r v i c e s  f o r  t h o s e  who b u i l d  w h i l e  he  i s  of  working age ,  
o r  h e  can  o t h e r w i s e  come i n t o  t h e  purchase  and c o n t r o l  o f  a  
house. Nor need t h e  f a c i l i t y  be a  house o r  o t h e r  o b j e c t  t h a t  
d i r e c t l y  s e r v e s  f o r  h i s  p e r s o n a l  u s e ;  he can s ave  t h e  money and 
i n v e s t  it  i n  a  company t h a t  b u i l d s  a  s tee l  m i l l ,  and s o  a t  second 
remove be s a i d  t o  b u i l d  a  s tee l  m i l l  t o  produce s tee l  i n  h i s  o l d  
age  t h a t  w i l l  be  s o l d  t o  buy him g r o c e r i e s .  
Thus seemingly unanswerable c a s e s  can  be c o n s t r u c t e d  t o  sup- 
p o r t  two opposing c o n t e n t i o n s :  t h a t  on a  funded scheme each  co- 
h o r t  independen t ly  p r o v i d e s  f o r  i t s  own o l d  age and t h a t  whether  
t h e  scheme i s  funded o r  n o t  each c o h o r t  when o l d  must depend on 
t h e  goods produced by t h e  c o h o r t  t h a t  i s  t h e n  o f  working age. 
The f i r s t  c a s e  i s  b u i l t  by t h i n k i n g  o f  t h e  s a v i n g  and inves tment  
o f  money o r  o f  p h y s i c a l  s a v i n g  o f  d u r a b l e  consumer goods l i k e  
houses .  The second c a s e  i s  made by t h i n k i n g  o f  p e r i s h a b l e  goods 
l i k e  b r e ad ,  t h a t  have t o  be  produced from day t o  day ,  and exclud-  
i n g  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  s av ing .  
The e x t e n t  t o  which t h e  c o h o r t s  can  be independent  o f  one  
a n o t h e r  i s  l i m i t e d :  i f  t h e  s o c i e t y  c o l l a p s e d  t h e r e  would be  
n o t h i n g  f o r  anyone, i n c l u d i n g  t h e  o l d .  I f  t h e  s o c i e t y  does  n o t  
c o l l a p s e  b u t  s u f f e r s  w i l d  i n f l a t i o n ,  t h e  p o s s e s s i o n  of  pens ions  
r e s u l t i n g  from s a v i n g ,  however f u l l y  funded,  w i l l  do no good. 
I t  i s  i m p o r t a n t  t o  draw a  d i s t i n c t i o n  between t h i s  d i s c u s -  
s i o n  and a  s i m i l a r  d i s c u s s i o n  t h a t  was h e a r d  d u r i n g  t h e  war.  I t  
was s a i d  t h a t  a  war h a s  t o  be  fough t  i n  r e a l  t e r m s ,  t h a t  t h e r e  
i s  no way of p u t t i n g  t h e  burden on a  f u t u r e  g e n e r a t i o n .  Borrow- 
i n g  seems t o  do t h i s ,  b u t  t h a t  i s  an i l l u s i o n ,  f o r  borrowing i s  
no more t h a n  a  f i n a n c i a l  r ea r rangement ;  t h e  t a n k s  and p l a n e s  have  
t o  be made w h i l e  t h e  war i s  going  on, and t h e y  might  j u s t  a s  w e l l  
be p a i d  by t a x e s  t h e n  a s  by t a x e s  l a t e r .  Borrowing merely re- 
d i s t r i b u t e s  c l a i m s  subsequen t  t o  t h e  war.  F i g h t i n g  a  war d i f f e r s  
i n  many ways from s u p p o r t i n g  peop le  i n  t h e i r  o l d  a g e ,  b u t  most 
i m p o r t a n t l y  i n t h a t  once i t  o c c u r s  a  war c a n n o t  be p r e p a r e d  f o r  i n  
advance.  Old age  i s  d i f f e r e n t  i n  b e i n g  p e r f e c t l y  p r e d i c t a b l e ,  
and it i s  r i d i c u l o u s  t o  s a y  t h a t  an  i n d i v i d u a l  o r  a  c o h o r t  c a n n o t  
s a v e  up f o r  it. The g e n e r a l  p r i n c i p l e  i s  t h a t  one c a n n o t  draw 
on f u t u r e  p r o d u c t i o n  f o r  t o d a y ' s  needs ,  b u t  one can  c e r t a i n l y  
draw on p a s t  p r o d u c t i o n  i f  one h a s  had t h e  n e c e s s a r y  f o r e s i g h t ,  
I have g i v e n  examples i n  p h y s i c a l  terms by which i n d i v i d u a l s  
and c o h o r t s  can  p r o v i d e  f o r  t h e i r  o l d  a g e ,  b u t  t h a t  may n o t  be  
a d e q u a t e  f o r  a  complex money economy. I f  f o r  i n s t a n c e  i n d i v i d -  
u a l s  s a v e  b u t  no one wants  t o  i n v e s t ,  t h e  Keynesian problem, 
t h e n  n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g  any number o f  p h y s i c a l '  examples,  t h e  s o c i e t y  
a s  such  c a n n o t  p r o v i d e  i n  advance f o r  i t s  o l d  age .  Again, i f  t h e  
s o c i e t y  i s  based e n t i r e l y  on money a c c o u n t i n g ,  and money i s  n o t  
a  s t a b l e  r e p o s i t o r y  of v a l u e ,  a s  i n  p e r i o d s  o f  i n f l a t i o n ,  t h e n  
a g a i n  any t r a n s a c t i o n  a c r o s s  t i m e  i s  f r u s t r a t e d ,  i n c l u d i n g  s a v i n g  
f o r  o l d  a g e .  
A f u l l  fund would be a b o u t  t h e  o r d e r  of magnitude o f  t h e  
n a t i o n a l  d e b t ,  now approach ing  a  t r i l l i o n  d o l l a r s .  I f  t h e  U.S. 
scheme had been funded from t h e  s t a r t ,  and t h e  fund i n v e s t e d  a s  
t h e  n a t i o n a l  d e b t  was s u c c e s s i v e l y  i n c r e a s e d ,  t h e n  t h e  i n t e r e s t  
now p a i d  on  t h e  d e b t  would be a v a i l a b l e  f o r  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y .  
T h a t  i n t e r e s t  now amounts t o  abou t  $80 b i l l i o n ,  s o  it would c o v e r  
a lmos t  h a l f  t h e  c o s t  o f  c u r r e n t  p e n s i o n s .  
T h i s  would be  no paper  d i f f e r e n c e  from t h e  p r e s e n t  a r r a n g e -  
ment. W e  now t a x  o u r s e l v e s  ($80.4 b i l l i o n  i n  f i s c a l  1981) t o  
pay t h e  i n t e r e s t  on t h e  d e b t ,  and w e  s e p a r a t e l y  t a x  workers  t o  
pay t h e  p e n s i o n s  o f  $163 b i l l i o n  i n  1981. W e  would o f  c o u r s e  
s t i l l  need t a x e s  t o  c o v e r  t h e  i n t e r e s t  payments on t h e  d e b t ;  
s i n c e  t h e s e  a r e  h a l f  o f  t h e  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  burden ,  t h e y  c o u l d  
be  a p p l i e d  t o  r e l i e v e  t h e  wage e a r n e r  o f  t h e  e n t i r e  h a l f  of  t h e  
s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  t a x  t h a t  h e  now pays .  
I t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  peop le  and i n s t i t u t i o n s  would have  t o  a d j u s t  
i f  government bonds and t r e a s u r y  n o t e s  w e r e  n o t  a v a i l a b l e .  In-  
s u r a n c e  companies and o t h e r s  whose i n v e s t m e n t s  a r e  now determined 
by law would have t o  be  r e l e a s e d  from some a t  l e a s t  of  p r e s e n t  
r e s t r i c t i o n s .  They would be  pushed o u t  i n t o  f i n a n c i a l  marke t s  
t h a t  would c h a n n e l  t h e i r  funds  i n t o  p r o d u c t i v e  u s e .  S o c i a l  se- 
c u r i t y  f u n d s  d i r e c t l y  p r o v i d e  a b o u t  h a l f  o f  t h e  t o t a l  n e t  i n v e s t -  
ment i n  t h e  Swedish economy; w e  would a c h i e v e  t h e  s a n e  r e s u l t  
i n d i r e c t l y .  
The view t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no d i f f e r e n c e  between pay-as-you-go 
and fund ing  i s  e x p r e s s e d  w i t h  most ene rgy  and en thus iasm by 
Nicho las  A .  B a r r  ( 1 9 7 9 ) .  Spending by t h e  r e t i r e d  has  t o  be 
matched by non-spending by t h e  workforce .  Suppose t h a t  t h e  work- 
f o r c e  do n o t  want t o  spend less; suppose  t h a t  t h e y  s imply  r e p u d i -  
a t e  t h e  bonds o r  o t h e r  a s s e t s  t h a t  t h e  o l d  have  p u t  t h e i r  s a v i n g s  
i n t o .  For  B a r r  t h a t  p o s s i b i l i t y  i s  t o  b e  t a k e n  a s  s e r i o u s l y  a s  
t h e  r e f u s a l  t o  pay s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  t a x e s  i n  t h e  n e x t  g e n e r a t i o n .  
B a r r  v e r y  c o r r e c t l y  s a y s  t h a t  " t h e  c h o i c e  of pay-as-you-go 
o r  fund ing  i s  c o m p l e t e l y  i r r e l e v a n t  u n l e s s  t h e  method o f  f i n a n c e  
i s  t h e  cause  o f  a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  n a t i o n a l  ou tpu t . "  ( B a r r  1979 : 5 0 )  
But under  v e r y  g e n e r a l  c o n d i t i o n s  s a v i n g s  do c a u s e  an  i n c r e a s e  
i n  o u t p u t .  Unless  c a p i t a l  h a s  e n t i r e l y  c e a s e d  t o  b e  p r o d u c t i v e ,  
more o u t p u t  f o l l o w s  from more s a v i n g ,  and t h e  c l a i m  t o  t h a t  e x t r a  
o u t p u t  would be i n  t h e  hands o f  t h o s e  whose non-spending h a s  been 
r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  it. To a r g u e  o t h e r w i s e  i s  t o  be  o r i g i n a l  i n  a  
c o n t r i v e d  and c o n v o l u t e d  way. 
THE LIFE CYCLE MODEL 
The l i f e  c y c l e  model has  r i g h t l y  been p l a c e d  a t  t h e  c e n t e r  
o f  economic though t  on p e r s o n a l  s a v i n g .  I t  e x p l a i n s  i n  t e r m s  
of  i n d i v i d u a l  ( s t r i c t l y  household)  r a t i o n a l  b e h a v i o r  t h e  accumu- 
l a t i o n  o f  s a v i n g s  i n  t h e  economy a s  a  whole. The i d e a  h a s  r o o t s  
i n  I r v i n g  F i s h e r  and was used i n  t h e  s t u d y  o f  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  by 
Martin F e l d s t e i n  ( 1 9 7 4 ) .  I ts  p o i n t  i s  t h a t  t h e  young worker an- 
t i c i p a t e s  t h e  day when h i s  ea rn ings  w i l l  d e c l i n e ,  and he saves  
accord ing ly .  I n  one form t h e  person t a k e s  it t h a t  h i s  ea rn ings  
w i l l  end a t  a  f i x e d  age of r e t i r e m e n t ,  whi le  Martin F e l d s t e i n ' s  
extended l i f e  c y c l e  model does no t  f i x  t h e  age of  r e t i r e m e n t  i n  
advance b u t  a l lows  it t o  be determined i n  t h e  cou r se  of  f i t t i n g  
t h e  model. 
From t h e  s t a r t  c o n s t r a i n t s  were recognized t h a t  prevented 
people  from f r e e l y  r e d i s t r i b u t i n g  t h e i r  incomes over  time. The 
income curve has indeed a peak a t  an  age o l d e r  than  t h e  peak of  
family  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ;  people cease  t o  have any income a t  a l l  
beyond a c e r t a i n  age and y e t  they have t o  keep on l i v i n g ;  i f  t h e  
person can d e f e r  consumption he has by then  accumulated r e sou rces  
t h a t  can be used d i r e c t l y  o r  a s  c o l l a t e r a l  f o r  l oans .  But having 
t h e  spending p r e c e d e t h e  income o f f e r s  problems: c o l l e g e  s t u d e n t s  
t y p i c a l l y  a r e  unable  t o  guaran tee  repayment and s o  cannot  e a s i l y  
borrow on commercial money markets.  
These c o n s t r a i n t s  a r e  thoroughly recognized i n  t h e  economic 
l i t e r a t u r e .  What i s  much l e s s  recognized,  and throws a shadow 
of  doubt on t h e  a p p l i c a b i l i t y  o f t h e  e n t i r e  t heo ry ,  a r i s e s  on t h e  
a s s e t  o r  sav ing  s i d e ,  r a t h e r  t han  on t h e  consumption s i d e .  The 
i n d i v i d u a l  may know e x a c t l y  what h i s  e n t i r e  p a t t e r n  of f u t u r e  
ea rn ings  w i l l  be and e x a c t l y  what p a t t e r n  of consumption he wants ,  
and t h e  l a t t e r  may be s u f f i c i e n t l y  p o s t e r i o r  t o  t h e  former i n  
t ime so  t h a t  no borrowing i s  necessary ,  bu t  he has  no s t a b l e  re -  
p o s i t o r y  o f  va lue  f o r  h i s  sav ings .  A t  one t ime money served a s  
a r e p o s i t o r y  of v a l u e ,  bu t  t h e  f u t u r e  va lue  of  money i s  now h igh ly  
unce r t a in .  We know how w e l l  l and ,  s t o c k s ,  stamps, p a i n t i n g s ,  
a n t i q u e s  have r e t a i n e d  t h e i r  va lue  i n  t h e  p a s t .  But f o r  t h e  fu- 
t u r e  no one knows, n o t  even t h e  most a s t u t e .  A s e t  o f  o p t i o n s  
and choices  f o r  r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  consumption through t ime has 
been removed. 
Without a s t o r e  o f  va lue  t h e r e  i s  simply no p o i n t  i n  t a l k i n g  
about  t h e  l i f e  c y c l e  of d e s i r e d  consumption i n  terms of t h e  l i f e  
c y c l e  of  ea rn ings .  And t h i s  a p p l i e s  equa l ly  t o  i n d i v i d u a l s  and 
t o  groups of i n d i v i d u a l s ,  i n c l u d i n g  cohor t s .  
~ h u s  among many o t h e r  unpleasan t  consequences, i n f l a t i o n  
and t h e  e r r a t i c  changes i n  r e l a t i v e  p r i c e s  w i th  which it i s  as-  
s o c i a t e d  e f f e c t i v e l y  d e s t r o y s  t h e  u se fu lnes s  of any a t tempt  t o  
e x p l a i n  sav ings  i n  terms of t h e  l i f e  c y c l e  p a t t e r n  of consump- 
t i o n .  The consumer may be a s  r a t i o n a l  a s  one can ask f o r  on 
t h e  planned d i s t r i b u t i o n  of h i s  expend i tu re s ,  b u t  wi thout  a  
s t a b l e  r e p o s i t o r y  of va lue  he i s  impotent  t o  implement t h a t  d i s -  
t r i b u t i o n .  
SOCIAL SECURITY AND SOCIAL COHESION 
When s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  was i n i t i a t e d  i n  t h e  1930s it seemed 
t o  r e q u i r e  only  a  1 p e r c e n t  t a x  on t h e  wage e a r n e r  and 1 pe rcen t  
of p a y r o l l  from t h e  employer. A s  such it was a  t r i f l i n g  p a r t  of 
t h e  Fede ra l  budget .  The p u b l i c  was i n  f a v o r ,  indeed a lmost  en- 
t r anced  by t h e  d i scovery  t h a t  t h e  problem of o l d  age could be 
so lved  a t  s o  l i t t l e  c o s t .  The i n i t i a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  proposa l  
was indeed opposed by Republicans i n  Congress, and i t  became a  
p a r t i s a n  i s s u e  i n  t h e  1936 p r e s i d e n t i a l  e l e c t i o n ,  b u t  a f t e r  t h a t  
it d isappeared  from p o l i t i c s ;  both  p a r t i e s  agreed t o  t h e  scheme 
a s  a  whole and t o  i t s  many succes s ive  ex t ens ions .  No longer  
would i t  be necessary  f o r  o l d  people t o  be dependent on t h e i r  
c h i l d r e n  i n d i v i d u a l l y ;  now they  could be looked a f t e r  c o l l e c -  
t i v e l y .  Whereas t hey  had been a  burden t o  t h e i r  c h i l d r e n  they  
would be on ly  a  smal l  cash  o u t l a y  f o r  t h e  community a s  a  whole. 
Of course  t hose  who made t h e  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  c a l c u l a t i o n s  
know t h a t  t h e  s h i f t  from i n d i v i d u a l  suppor t  of p a r e n t s  t o  c o l -  
l e c t i v e  suppor t  cou ld  n o t  pos s ib ly  l i g h t e n  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  burden, 
whatever i t s  o t h e r  advantages .  I t  i s  more expensive t o  suppor t  
people  i n  cash  and independence than  i n  kind w i t h i n  t h e  family .  
Now they could have s e p a r a t e  dwel l ings  and be independent o f  
t h e i r  c h i l d r e n ,  where p rev ious ly  they had t y p i c a l l y  l i v e d  i n  t h e  
homes of  t h e i r  c h i l d r e n .  Ac tua r i e s  knew t h a t  someone would have 
t o  pay t h e  added r e n t .  
Note t h a t  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  i s  indeed d i f f e r e n t  from depend- 
i n g  on o n e ' s  c h i l d r e n  i n  va r ious  i n c i d e n t a l  ways. The suppor t  
by c h i l d r e n  o f f e r e d  by s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  i s  equa l  f o r  o l d  people  
who have many c h i l d r e n  and f o r  t hose  who have few; it i s  i n  cash 
r a t h e r  than  i n  k ind .  Yet t h e  same i n t e r g e n e r a t i o n a l  t r a n s f e r  i s  
involved,  wi th  t h e  main d i f f e r e n c e  t h a t  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  removes 
t h e  i n c e n t i v e  f o r  i n d i v i d u a l  couples  t o  have c h i l d r e n .  
From a  s h e e r l y  r a t i o n a l  pe rcep t ion  o f  s e l f  i n t e r e s t ,  a s  
Samuelson ( 1 9 5 8 )  poin ted  o u t  over  2 0  yea r s  ago,  t h e  r i g h t  t h i n g  
f o r  any gene ra t ion  t o  do i s  t o  r e p u d i a t e  t h e  i m p l i c i t  "debt"  t o  
i t s  e l d e r s .  A s  he says ,  p rocess  of  i n f l a t i o n  does  t h i s  i n  r e -  
s p e c t  of pe r sona l  s av ings  t i e d  t o  nominal d o l l a r s .  A gene ra t ion  
faced wi th  a  p a r t i c u l a r l y  sha rp  r i s e  i n  t a x  could even a rgue  
t h a t  it was n o t  i n  any way break ing  i t s  word, s i n c e  t h e  promises 
t o  pay pensions  had never been given by it b u t  by a  gene ra t ion  
long p a s t ,  i f  it has  been given by anyone. I t  might admit  t h a t  
it rece ived  i t s  upbringing and educa t ion  from i t s  p a r e n t s  bu t  
deny t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of  any c o n t r a c t  f o r  a  quid  pro  quo. I t  might 
a rgue  t h a t  t h e  r a t i o  of o l d  age c o s t s  t o  upbr inging c o s t s  has  
r i s e n  s o  g r e a t l y  ( e s p e c i a l l y  medical  expenses)  t h a t  i f  t h e r e  
eve r  was a  c o n t r a c t  i t s  terms have so  changed t h a t  no one can  be 
he ld  t o  it. 
S o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  can be regarded a s  a  way of coun te r ing  t h e  
diminished cohesion w i t h i n  t h e  fami ly  of a  modern i n d u s t r i a l  
s o c i e t y .  When f i rm  bonds e x i s t  among t h e  s e v e r a l  gene ra t ions  
w i t h i n  a  family ,  governments a r e  ha rd ly  expected t o  t a k e  funds 
from i n d i v i d u a l  workers and hand them over  t o  t h e  aged p a r e n t s  
of  those  workers.  The intermediacy o f  government on ly  comes t o  
be o f f e r e d  and welcomed a s  t h e  fami ly  l o s e s  i t s  c e n t r a l i t y .  When 
t h e  fami ly  was s o c i e t y ' s  main u n i t ,  working people  would no 
sooner s e e  t h e i r  h e l p l e s s  p a r e n t s  go i n t o  an i n s t i t u t i o n  f o r  t h e  
aged than  they would send t h e i r  c h i l d r e n  o u t  t o  be looked a f t e r  
i n  an orphanage. No ma t t e r  how it i s  desc r ibed ,  t h e  advent  of  
s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  marks a  s t a g e i n t h e  loosen ing  of fami ly  bonds. 
Yet s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  i t s e l f  r e q u i r e s  bonds, though of another  
k ind .  I t  i s  necessary  t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l s  r e p l a c e  t h e i r  l o y a l t y  t o  
p a r e n t s  w i t h i n  t h e  fami ly  by l o y a l t y  t o  t h e  s t a t e ,  i f  they  a r e  
t o  con t inue  t o  pay t a x e s .  
Is it p o s s i b l e  t h a t  t h e  same s o c i a l  and psychologica l  causes  
t h a t  make f o r  f a m i l i e s  w i th  few c h i l d r e n ,  make a l s o  f o r  households 
i n  which t h e r e  a r e  no o l d  people? The young a d u l t  wants t o  be 
f r e e  of  c h i l d r e n ,  f r e e  o f  p a r e n t s ,  even ( t o  judge from d ivo rce  
r a t e s )  f r e e  o f  spouse.  I n  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  r e s o r t  i s  t o  govern- 
ment. W i l l  t h e  bonds h e r e ,  a s  r e f l e c t e d  i n  w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  pay 
t a x e s ,  be a b l e  t o  s t a n d  t h e  i nc reased  load? 
Echoing Samuelson, Shubik s t a t e s  t h a t  
I f  a  man were i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c ,  u t i l i t a r i a n  and p r i m a r i l y  
s e l f  concerned,  then  wi thout  an e x t r a  economic s t r u c t u r e  
t o  provide t h e  connect ions  t h e r e  i s  no guaran tee  t h a t  t h e  
gene ra t ions  would hold  t o g e t h e r  i n  a s t a b l e  way. (Shubik 
1981:3) 
One way i n  w h i c h t h e g e n e r a t i o n s  can be glued t o g e t h e r  i s  by 
p i e c e s  of  paper.  Suppose t h a t  i n  o r d e r  t o  t a k e  a job a man o r  
woman needed a p i e c e  of paper ,  and it was on ly  p o s s i b l e  t o  s ecu re  
t h a t  paper from someone who was now o l d  and unable  o r  unwi l l ing  
t o  work. Then t h e  o l d  person could g ive  o r  l end  t h e  paper t o  a 
young one on t h e  c o n d i t i o n  t h a t  he be maintained.  Once t h e  o l d  
person d i e d  t h e  paper  would pass  d e f i n i t i v e l y  t o  t h e  young, and 
he would r e p e a t  t h e  p roces s ,  exchanging i t  f o r  h i s  maintenance 
when he became o l d  (Shubik 198 1 ) . 
A c u r i o u s  arrangement? Not a t  a l l .  I t  i s  e x a c t l y  what i s  
done i n  a g r i c u l t u r a l  s o c i e t i e s  wi th  p r i v a t e  ownership of l and .  
The p i e c e  of  paper i s  t h e  deed t o  t h e  fami ly  p rope r ty ;  t h e  deed 
i s  passed on through succes s ive  g e n e r a t i o n s ,  always wi th  t h e  con- 
d i t i o n  t h a t  t h e  o l d  people  who g ive  i t  over  have t h e  r i g h t  t o  be 
supported a s  long a s  they  l i v e  (Arthur  1981) .  
S o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  has  come t o  be b u i l t  i n t o  our  e x p e c t a t i o n s  
w i th in  t h e  l a s t  few decades ,  and it shows how qu ick ly  an i t em 
can move from no t  e x i s t i n g  a t  a l l ,  t o  being a luxury ,  t o  being 
a n  a b s o l u t e  n e c e s s i t y .  A gene ra t ion  o r  two ago people  w e r e  ex- 
pected t o  p repare  f o r  t h e i r  o l d  age i n d i v i d u a l l y ;  they might 
p repare  by sav ing  o r  by having c h i l d r e n ,  o r  both .  I f  they d i d  
n e i t h e r  o r  i f  t h e i r  c h i l d r e n  were t o o  poor t o  look a f t e r  them, 
then they  had t o  r e s o r t  t o  o t h e r  r e l a t i v e s ;  f a i l i n g  t h a t  they 
s u f f e r e d  t h e  punishment of  being looked a f t e r  by c h a r i t y ,  p r i v a t e  
o r  pub l i c .  The i n c e n t i v e  t o  save and t o  have c h i l d r e n  was s t r o n g .  
Many t h i n g s  have changed s i n c e  t h a t  t ime ,  only  50 y e a r s  ago. 
The b i r t h  r a t e  i s  down, s o  f a m i l i e s  have fewer c h i l d r e n .  Those 
c h i l d r e n  they  do have want t o  l e a d  t h e i r  own l i v e s ;  they t y p i c a l l y  
l e ave  home long be fo re  marr iage,  and having l o s t  t h e  h a b i t  of  
l i v i n g  wi th  t h e i r  p a r e n t s  do no t  o f t e n  welcome those  same par-  
e n t s  back i n t o  t h e i r  home 2 0  yea r s  l a t e r .  I t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  some- 
t imes p a r e n t s  a r e  inexpensive baby s i t t e r s .  I n  Eas t e rn  Europe 
o l d  people have t h e  very important  u se  of  queuing i n  s t o r e s  f o r  
l u x u r i e s ,  and even f o r  n e c e s s i t i e s .  Yet everywhere d i g n i t y  i s  
l o s t  f o r  o l d  people  who have no o t h e r  o p t i o n  than  t o  r e t u r n  and 
l i v e  w i th  t h e i r  c h i l d r e n .  Even t h e  f a i t h f u l  s i n g l e  daughte r  
whose mother i s  l i v i n g  wi th  h e r ,  probably t h e  c i rcumstance i n  
which t h e  p a r e n t  i s  b e s t - o f f ,  a p p r e c i a t e s  t h e  e x t r a  income pro- 
vided by t h e  mother ' s  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  check,  and t h e  check in -  
c r e a s e s  t h e  mother ' s  o p t i o n s  and d i g n i t y .  
Thus t h e  c o n s t i t u e n c y  f o r  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  goes f a r  beyond 
t h e  o l d  people who a r e  drawing. I t  i n c l u d e s  t h e i r  c h i l d r e n ,  
perhaps o t h e r  r e l a t i v e s ,  indeed v i r t u a l l y  t h e  e n t i r e  e l e c t o r a t e .  
The young want t h e i r  p a r e n t s  t o  be independent ,  and only l o o s e l y  
do they i n d e n t i f y  t h e  p a r e n t ' s  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  check wi th  t h e  
t a x  they a r e  paying.  
We a r e  r i c h  i n  d a t a  on a t t i t u d e s  of people  of  working age,  
and e s p e c i a l l y  r i c h  on t h e i r  a t t i t u d e s  t ~ w a r d s  c h i l d r e n .  We 
know much l e s s  about  a t t i t u d e s  towards p a r e n t s .  Pa ren t s  a r e  
s ac red  o b j e c t s ,  on whom an e s p e c i a l l y  l a r g e  gap between s t a t e d  
a t t i t u d e s  on one s i d e  and behavior  on t h e  o t h e r  i s  t o  be expected.  
Yet a l though people  s t a t e  a t t i t u d e s  d i f f e r e n t  from those  e x h i b i t e d  
i n  behavior ,  s k i l l e d  ques t ion ing  could t e l l  us  much about  i n t e r -  
g e n e r a t i o n a l  l i n k s ,  both t hose  t h a t  a r e  d i r e c t  and t h o s e  mediated 
by t h e  s t a t e .  
CONCLUSION 
Whether t h e  r e a d e r  f i n d s  t h e  s u b j e c t  of  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  
f a s c i n a t i n g  o r  t i resome,  he i s  going t o  hear  a  good d e a l  of it 
i n  t h e  cou r se  of  t h e  nex t  50 years .  A f t e r  about 2030 t h e  r a t i o  
of  people  of  r e t i r e d  age w i l l  s t a b i l i z e  a s  a  r a t i o  o f  t h e  working 
popula t ion ,  and a t  l e a s t  demographic causes  w i l l  no t  f u r t h e r  ex- 
a c e r b a t e  t h e  problem. U n t i l  then demographic t endenc ie s ,  a c t i n g  
a long  wi th  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  dynamics and wi th  economic c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  
r e l a t e d  t o  sav ing  i n  t h e  n a t i o n a l  economy, w i l l  keep t h e  m a t t e r  
i n  t h e  f o r e f r o n t .  
A s  a  measure of  t h e  p r e s e n t  weight of  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  i n  
our  economy, t h e  1982 budget submit ted by t h e  C a r t e r  adminis t ra -  
t i o n ,  which has  n o t  been changed much i n  t h i s  r e s p e c t  by Reagan, 
allowed $187 b i l l i o n  f o r  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y ,  over  25 pe rcen t  of  t h e  
t o t a l .  T o t a l  m i l i t a r y  expendi tures  were t o  be l e s s  than  25 per-  
c e n t ,  and t h e s e  two headings c o n s t i t u t e  h a l f  o f  t h e  f e d e r a l  bud- 
g e t .  The average s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  t a x  per  employed member of  
t h e  l abo r  f o r c e  i s  $1800. 
The worker i s  going t o  f i n d  h i s  c o n t r i b u t i o n  r i s i n g  from 
t h i s  l e v e l  decade a f t e r  decade,  h i s  payment always t h e  pension 
of  o t h e r s ,  never f o r  h imse l f ,  and always f o r  a  fund i n  danger  
of  d e f a u l t .  Much a s  he may o b j e c t  t o  t h i s ,  i n  h i s  o t h e r  c a p a c i t y  
of son o r  daughte r  o f  an aged p a r e n t ,  he w i l l  be g l ad  o f  t h e  
f i n a n c i a l  p r o v i s i o n  f o r  o l d  age.  
The P r e s i d e n t ' s  Commission on Pension Pol icy  (1980) has  
many sugges t ions  f o r  b r ing ing  income and outgo i n t o  l i n e .  I t  
took up a  sugges t ion  o f  V ic to r  Fuchs t h a t  t h e  r e t i r e m e n t  age be 
i nc reased  two months each  ca l ende r  yea r .  The Commission d i d  
n o t  recommend t h a t  t h i s  s t a r t  now, bu t  i n  t h e  yea r  2000, so  t h a t  
i t  would b r i n g  t h e  normal age up t o  68 by t h e  year  2018. To 
s t a r t  now would be an  i n j u s t i c e  t o  t hose  approaching r e t i r e m e n t ,  
says  t h e  Commission. Going t o  u n i v e r s a l  coverage would provide 
some i n i t i a l  advantage t o  t h e  scheme, which i s  t o  say t h e  t a x  
base would be en l a rged  more t h a n t h e  payments f o r  a  number of 
y e a r s .  B e n e f i t s  cou ld  be made s u b j e c t  t o  income t a x .  Most i m -  
p o r t a n t ,  some p a r t  of  t h e  scheme would c o n s i s t  i n  persona l  sav- 
i ngs .  These would be mandated, n o t  l e f t  t o  i n d i v i d u a l  d i s c r e t i o n ,  
bu t  t h e  person could be f r e e  t o  pu t  t h e  sav ings  i n t o  government 
o r  p r i v a t e  funds .  
Of course  a  funded scheme i n  any increment would add t o  t h e  
burden ove r  more than  a  gene ra t ion  before  t h e  i n t e r e s t  on t h e  
fund could lower t h e  n e t  c o s t .  For t h i s  reason  funding would 
have t o  be in t roduced  s lowly,  r e p l a c i n g  a  smal l  p a r t  a t  a  t ime 
of t h e  p r e s e n t  p-ay-as-you go. 
Horl ick and Skolnick (1978) provide a  va luab le  account  of  
t h e  European expe r i ence  wi th  mandated p r i v a t e  schemes t h a t  a r e  
funded and a r e  taken a s  supplementary t o  e x i s t i n g  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y .  
They d e a l  w i th  fou r  c o u n t r i e s :  Swi tzer land  and t h e  Nether lands ,  
where mandated p r i v a t e  schemes have been accepted i n  p r i n c i p l e ,  
though t h e  d e t a i l s  a r e  y e t  t o  be worked o u t ;  Great  B r i t a i n ,  
where employers can come i n t o  a  s econd- t i e r  government scheme o r  
c o n t r a c t  o u t  and adopt a  p r i v a t e  scheme; Sweden, where t h e  p r i -  
v a t e  pens ion  l a y e r  i s  a l r eady  o p e r a t i v e ,  b u t  no t  q u i t e  mandatory. 
The concept  of s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  o r i g i n a t e d  i n  Europe; we 
could w e l l  heed some of t h e  l e s s o n s  of European expe r i ences .  
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